bolted into a concrete foundation. There was also electrical
wiring throughout the structure. Nevertheless, Rowe J.A. held
that the building was a trade fixture that could be removed by
the tenant at the end of the lease: Humby, at para. 31.
 The above cases — as well as Richardson and Starmark
Property — demonstrate that the determination of whether an
asset is a fixture versus a trade fixture or chattel is a question of
mixed fact and law. In this case, the trial judge applied the three
requisite elements of the legal test for a trade fixture: ( i) whether
the asset is affixed to the ground by the tenant; ( ii) whether
the asset is used for the purpose of a trade or commerce; and
( iii) whether the asset can be removed without material damage
to the premises. Only element ( iii) was in question at trial.
 The trial judge found the structural assets could be
removed without damage to the premises, at para. 29 of his reasons. The trial judge was entitled to reject the appellant’s evidence regarding material damage that might result if the
structural assets were removed. Indeed, there was evidence the
appellant removed the barrier poles and nets at a later date
without material damage. The trial judge committed no palpable
or overriding error in concluding the structural assets were
removable trade fixtures. I would not give effect to this ground
(3) Were the structural assets leasehold improvements?
 The appellant’s alternative argument that the structural
assets were actually leasehold improvements has no merit. The
structural assets cannot be simultaneously both trade fixtures
and leasehold improvements. The test for whether an asset is a
leasehold improvement is the same as the test for whether an
asset is a fixture: Caledonia Service, at para. 14. There must be a
sufficient degree and object of annexation such that the assets
become part of the land. In this sense, a true “fixture” is the same
as a leasehold improvement in the context of leases. As explained
above, the trial judge made no palpable or overriding error in
finding the structural assets were trade fixtures. By necessary
implication, he found the structural assets were not leasehold
improvements. I see no basis to interfere with this decision.
(4) Was the appellant’s distraint permitted by s. 41 of
 The appellant submits that s. 41 of the CTA allows it to
distrain the respondent’s assets within six months following the
end of a lease even if it chose to terminate the lease. I disagree.
Section 41 of the CTA states: