I would not give effect to this ground of appeal. In
essence, the appellant is attempting to reargue, on appeal, his
position at trial. The expert evidence that the appellant put forward at trial emphasized the various factors he now relies upon
in support of his contention that less money should be imputed
to him. The trial judge rejected that expert evidence, which he
was entitled to do.
 Where the court considers that s. 16 income (line 150
income) under the CSGs does not provide the fairest determination of income, s. 17 of the CSGs allows the court to consider the
pattern of income of the payor over the last three years. Section
19(1)(g) of the CSGs permits the court to impute “such amount
of income to a parent or spouse as it considers appropriate”
where “the parent or spouse unreasonably deducts expenses
from income”. As the trial judge noted, s. 19(1)(g) does not
require establishing that the spouse acted improperly or outside
the norm in deducting expenses. Such deductions may be permissible from a tax perspective.
 There was ample evidence at trial that the appellant
had personal expenses that were paid by his businesses, including for vehicles, travel, renovations to his property, credit cards
and legal fees. There is no question that the trial judge was entitled to impute some additional income to the appellant pursuant
to s. 19(1)(g). The only question was how much.
 The trial judge preferred much of the respondent’s
expert’s evidence and gave reasons for that preference. He
explained that the major difference between the two experts’
approaches to income analysis was that the respondent’s expert
attributed income from each of the companies to HA and then
attributed the income from HA to the appellant. The appellant’s
expert, on the other hand, attributed income to the appellant
only from a subset of the companies — he did not attribute any
income from Matcon, HCM or RWH. As the appellant’s expert
put it, he attributed income only from “majority companies”. The
trial judge rejected this approach.
 The trial judge accepted the respondent’s expert’s evidence that the businesses were profitable and growing —
Matcon and HCM had increased in value significantly since separation. He also noted that the appellant was able to continue to
fund an extravagant lifestyle and had sufficient monies to purchase additional properties within his corporations and to
expand his new business ventures.
 The trial judge noted that both experts agreed that there
was significant income available in 2012 and 2013 and that the
appellant himself gave evidence that he had access to $1.3 million