Returning to AB’s history, AB discussed her pain with her
rheumatologist, who suggested more operations, but she refused
because she felt that the previous surgeries had not helped and
rather exacerbated her pain. The doctor prescribed increased
medication (fentanyl, morphine and prednisone), but her pain did
not abate. Indeed, by early 2016, her pain became so intense that
she was unable to sit in the dining room of the nursing home
without crying in pain, and since she did not wish to make the
other residents uncomfortable, she began spending almost all of
her time in her room.
 Meanwhile, Ontario residents began to bring applications
to the Superior Court of Justice seeking constitutional exemptions
in accordance with the Supreme Court’s direction in Carter (2016).
 On June 6, 2016, the suspension of invalidity expired
with no new federal legislation yet in place.
 After the suspension expired, an Ontario resident brought
an application for a declaration that his planned physician-assisted death was permitted at law because his circumstances
met the criteria enunciated in Carter (2015).
 On June 15, 2016, in P. (O.) v. Canada (Attorney General),
 O.J. No. 3122, 2016 ONSC 3956 (S.C.J.), I rejected the
argument that, given the expiration of the suspension of invalid-
ity, physician-assisted death was permissible without court
order. I held that to ensure the rule of law and to provide an
effective safeguard against potential risks to vulnerable people
from an unregulated regime of physician-assisted death and
pending the enactment of legislation by the federal government
to regulate physician-assisted death, the Superior Court of
Justice had the jurisdiction to issue individual constitutional
remedies under s. 24(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 to permit
physician-assisted death. In my reasons for decision, I stated,
at para. 56:
The situation of the need for court authorizations persists in the third
phase of the legal history of physician-assisted death and may persist until
Parliament enacts legislation without any constitutional deficiencies. I wish
to be clear, however, that there is nothing in this decision about O.P.’s case
that mandates that future phases of the legal history of physician-assisted
death will require judicial authorizations. Arguably, the medical establish-
ment is far better situated to supervise this constitutionally protected right,
but pending a constitutionally-sound enactment, it falls on the court to pro-
tect a constitutional right and the rule of law.
 Two days later, on June 17, 2016, Parliament enacted Bill
C-14, which amended the Criminal Code to set out a detailed
regulatory regime for medical assistance in dying. Bill C-14 left
the decision of whether a patient meets the Criminal Code’s
criteria to medical professionals, not the court.