before providing a person with medical assistance in dying. The
court cannot assume the responsibility of forming somebody
else’s opinion, and the court obviously does not provide medical
assistance in dying or at all. The court is a legal practitioner not
a medical practitioner.
 I disagree, however, that the court cannot do anything but
dismiss AB’s application. Ontario and Canada say that a declaration by this court cannot have any practical effect and, therefore, should not be made, because the court cannot assume the
tasks assigned to the person who will provide medical assistance
 Although I agree that this court should not make a declaration that cannot have any practical effect; however, where
I part company with Ontario and Canada is in the idea that
there is no declaration that this court can make in the circumstances of this case that would have utility. In my opinion,
it would be useful to declare as a matter of statutory interpretation (if I can, based on the evidence presented to the court) that
AB’s natural death has become reasonably foreseeable within
the meaning of s. 241.2(2)(d) of the Criminal Code.
 In my opinion, making this declaration of statutory interpretation would be useful and fall with this court’s jurisdiction to
interpret and declare the civil law, and it would not interfere
with prosecutorial discretion by issuing declarations purporting
to predetermine criminal liability. It should be kept in mind
that the genuine issue is AB’s civil and human rights not
Physician 1’s exposure to criminal proceedings. In making an
interpretative declaration, I will not be declaring that courts
could or should grant pre-approvals for persons seeking medical
assistance in dying nor will I declare a jurisdiction or responsibility on the courts that Parliament has assigned to the medical
profession. In making an interpretative declaration, I will be
addressing AB’s civil rights under a hybrid provision in a statute
that has a role to play in both civil and criminal law.
 I accept that prosecutors, not courts, determine whether
criminal prosecutions should proceed and that civil courts
should not interfere with prosecutorial discretion by issuing declarations that purport to predetermine compliance with the
Criminal Code. See R. v. Beare,  2 S.C.R. 387, 
S.C.J. No. 92, at pp. 410-11 S.C.R.; R. v. Power,  1 S.C.R.
601,  S.C.J. No. 29, at pp. 615-16 S.C.R.; Krieger v. Law
Society of Alberta,  3 S.C.R. 372,  S.C.J. No. 45, 2002
SCC 65, at paras. 46-47; Miazga v. Kvello Estate,  3 S.C.R.
339,  S.C.J. No. 51, 2009 SCC 51, at paras. 45-48; R. v.
Anderson,  2 S.C.R. 167,  S.C.J. No. 41, 2014 SCC