41, at paras. 30-32, 44 and 46-48; Henry v. British Columbia
(Attorney General),  2 S.C.R. 214,  S.C.J. No. 24,
2015 SCC 24, at para. 49; R. v. Cawthorne,  1 S.C.R. 983,
 S.C.J. No. 32, 2016 SCC 32, at paras. 23-25 and 28.
 I also accept that in London Health Sciences Centre v.
K. (R.) (Guardian ad litem of),  O.J. No. 4128, 152 D.L.R.
(4th) 724 (Gen. Div.), at paras. 1-10, and in Bentley (Litigation
guardian of) v. Maplewood Seniors Care Society,  B.C.J. No.
181, 2014 BCSC 165, affd on other grounds  B.C.J. No. 367,
2015 BCCA 91, the courts in Ontario and British Columbia considered whether they should issue declarations to predetermine
whether health care providers considering ceasing treatment in
an end-of-life situation would be immune from potential future
criminal liability, and in both cases, the courts refused to issue the
requested declaration because it could have no practical effect or
would impermissibly interfere with prosecutorial discretion.
 In the immediate case, however, in making a declaration,
if I can properly make it based on the evidence, I am not conferring immunity upon Physician 1, nor am I providing him with
any defences he does not already have under the Criminal Code,
nor am I relieving him of any obligations he has under the
 In the case at bar, unlike the situations in London Health
Sciences Centre v. K. (R.) (Guardian ad litem of) (1997) and in
Bentley (Litigation guardian of) v. Maplewood Seniors Care
Society, I am interpreting how a statute affects the civil rights of
the patient and not the civil rights or criminality of the acts or
omissions of the medical practitioner providing or not providing
medical assistance. I do not see how interpreting s. 241.2(2)(d) of
the Criminal Code improperly interferes with prosecutorial discretion. In London Health Sciences Centre, the physician actually
sought a declaration of immunity, which I shall not grant in
the immediate case. In Bentley (Litigation guardian of), the hospital sought a declaration that it lawfully could follow the direction of the substitute decision-maker not to feed the patient and
be free of any exposure to criminal liability, and it was quite
understandable why a court would decline to grant such a declaration. The case at bar is distinguishable from those cases. In
the case at bar, I shall [be] interpreting the words of a statute
and not making findings about criminal liability.
 Rule 14.05(3)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O.
1990, Reg. 194 provides, among other things, that a proceeding
may be brought by application where the relief claimed, depends
on the interpretation of a statute. In the case at bar, AB
seeks the remedy of a declaration about the interpretation of