s. 241.2(2)(d) of the Criminal Code. At the heart of her application is her constitutionally protected right to a physician assisted death should she meet the criteria established by Parliament.
 AB’s application is of the type brought in Schaeffer v.
Wood (2011), 107 O.R. (3d) 721,  O.J. No. 5033, 2011
ONCA 716. In that case, the applicants successfully sought an
interpretation of a legislative framework governing investigations by the Special Investigations Unit, which was established
by the Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.15. That legislation
had left unspecified whether police officers involved in SIU
investigations were permitted to consult with legal counsel prior
to drafting notes that they were required to make.
 The regime for medical assistance in dying is in early
days, and given the extreme gravity of the issues involved and
the enormous public interest in how the Canadian regime operates, there is utility in removing doubts about the interpretation
and operation of the statute creating the regime. This exercise,
however, is not to do anything more than that, and it certainly is
not an exercise that can in advance remove or alter the role of
the medical practitioners in the regime, and it is not an exercise
that will create barriers by requiring or offering the alternative
of judicial approvals of requests for medical assistance in dying.
 An interpretation of s. 241.2(2)(d) of the Criminal Code is
not granting a constitutional exemption, which the circumstances of the immediate case do not call for, nor is it a judicial
determination of whether AB is eligible to receive medical assistance in accordance with the regime established by Parliament.
An interpretation of s. 241.2(2)(d) does not grant Physician 1
immunity nor an exemption from complying with all the
requirements of the legislation.
 All the court can do in the circumstances of the immediate
case is to clarify what Parliament meant in s. 241.2(2)(d) so that
Physician 1 and other physicians have no misunderstanding
about how to comply with the legislation. There is no floodgates
concern because the court need do this only once for whatever
benefit it may provide to AB and others.
 Although AB conflated her argument, an interpretation of
s. 241.2(2)(d) is also not an interpretation of s. 241.2(3)(a), which
stipulates that before a medical practitioner provides a person
with medical assistance, he or she must be of the opinion that
the person meets all of the criteria set out in subsections
241.2(1) and (2), which includes the criterion of s. 241.2(2)(d)
that their natural death has become reasonably foreseeable.
 The application before the court is not about interpreting
what it means for a medical practitioner “to be of the opinion that