forming opinions on. Physician 1 and all other physicians are
equally capable of determining whether the criteria or factors are
not satisfied because a natural death is not reasonably foreseeable.
[ 85] During 2015-2016 in the run up to the enactment of Bill
14, some of these factors or criteria were considered in the case
law about what was formerly described as physician-assisted
death and what is now described as medical assistance in dying.
In B. (A.) v. Canada (Attorney General) (2016), 129 O.R. (3d) 749,
 O.J. No. 1389, 2016 ONSC 1912 (S.C.J.) and in J. (I.) v.
Canada (Attorney General) (2016), 131 O.R. (3d) 789,  O.J.
No. 2669, 2016 ONSC 3380 (S.C.J.), I held that a grievous
medical condition connotes that the person’s medical condition
greatly or enormously interferes with the quality of that person’s
life. In J. (I.) v. Canada (Attorney General), supra, I held that
in determining whether a person satisfies the criteria for a
physician-assisted death, the proximity or remoteness of death
and the duration of suffering are relevant factors that must be
considered in the unique and special circumstances of any applicant. In Canada (Attorney General) v. F. (E.),  A.J. No. 505,
2016 ABCA 155, the Alberta Court of Appeal held that the constitutional exemption granted in Carter v. Canada (Attorney
General), 2016, supra, does not require the applicant’s medical
condition to be terminal.
[ 86] Thus, as a matter of statutory interpretation, I can say
that a person in circumstances like those in which AB finds herself, is a person in circumstances that fall within the meaning of
s. 241.2(2)(d) of the Criminal Code.
[ 87] There may be cases of doubt about the ambit of
s. 241.2(2)(d), but AB’s case of an almost 80-year-old woman in an
advanced state of incurable, irreversible, worsening illness with
excruciating pain and no quality of life is not one of them. Nor is
hers a case where she can say that the federal government has
enacted legislation that does not go far enough in respecting her
constitutional right to choose a medically assisted death.
[ 88] In the case at bar, Physician 1’s deeds belie his words of
uncertainty. He was perfectly capable and indeed did form an opinion about AB’s natural death being reasonably foreseeable. That
was his task, not the court’s task. All the court can do is to declare
that as a matter of statutory interpretation based on the evidence
before it, AB’s natural death has become reasonably foreseeable
within the meaning of s. 241.2(2)(d) of the Criminal Code.
[ 89] For the above reasons, I declare that in accordance with
the proper interpretation of s. 241.2(2)(d) of the Criminal Code,