The appellant argues that the statements of Linda Short
should not have been admitted. The appellant also challenges
the admissibility of some of the other out-of-court statements.
 I do not propose to review the entirety of the evidentiary
rulings. I will, however, make two observations. First, to the
extent that the statements were tendered as admissible hearsay
under the principled exception, for example, the statements of
Linda Short, the admissibility of those statements may be
affected by the judgment in R. v. Bradshaw,  S.C.J.
No. 35, 2017 SCC 35, 349 C.C.C. (3d) 429. That decision,
released after the trial, may impact the assessment of the
threshold reliability of some of the out-court-statements.
 My second observation is a more general one. The various
out-of-court statements were offered for different purposes.
Some were presented as evidence of the state of the marriage,
Mrs. Short’s state of mind prior to her death, or her intended
course of conduct. Other statements were offered as evidence of
what the appellant said to Mrs. Short, and others in support of
inferences concerning the appellant’s state of mind, his animus
towards Mrs. Short, and his motive for killing her.
 The admissibility of out-of-court statements depends, in
part, on the purpose for which those statements are tendered.
Before admissibility can be properly determined, the party tendering the evidence must clearly articulate the precise purpose
for which the out-of-court statement is being tendered: R. v.
Bridgman,  O.J. No. 6653, 2017 ONCA 940, at para. 32.
Different parts of the same out-of-court statement may be offered for different evidentiary purposes requiring a different
analysis and possibly leading to a different admissibility ruling.
 I offer one example. The Crown led evidence of a statement Mrs. Short made to her divorce lawyer. In the statement,
Mrs. Short said various things that were admissible to show her
state of mind and her attitude toward the marriage. She also
referred to a threat the appellant made to her. That part of the
statement was relevant to Mrs. Short’s state of mind. However,
it was apparently also admitted as evidence of a threat made by
the appellant demonstrating his state of mind.
 If at the new trial, the statement is offered again as evidence of Mrs. Short’s state of mind and evidence of the appellant’s animus and motive, the admissibility of the statement will
have to be determined as it relates to each purpose. It does
not follow that because the statement is admissible to show
Mrs. Short’s state of mind, or intended course of conduct, that it
is necessarily admissible as a threat made by the appellant