showing his state of mind: R. v. Foreman (2002), 62 O.R. (3d)
204,  O.J. No. 4332 (C.A.), at paras. 31-35.
 I would allow the appeal, quash the conviction and order
a new trial on the charge of first degree murder.
Barker et al. v. Barker et al.
[Indexed as: Barker v. Barker]
2017 ONSC 3397
Superior Court of Justice, Perell J. June 1, 2017
Fiduciaries — Breach of fiduciary duty — Plaintiff bringing proposed
class action in 2000 on behalf of patients detained at Oak Ridge who
underwent therapy designed by defendant doctors between 1966 and
1983 — Plaintiff alleging that therapy amounted to torture — Plaintiff
seeking damages for battery, negligence and breach of fiduciary duty —
Action reconstituted as ordinary action with multiple plaintiffs in 2006
— No limitation period for breach of fiduciary duty existing in 2000 —
That cause of action extant when action was commenced and not subsumed within any statute-barred claims for battery and negligence —
Therapy amounting to torture — Defendants breaching their fiduciary
duty to plaintiffs — Doctrine of laches not applying.
In 2000, the plaintiff T commenced a proposed class action on behalf of
patients detained at the Oak Ridge Division of the Mental Health Centre in
Penetanguishene, Ontario who were subjected to therapy programs designed by
the defendant doctors between 1966 and 1983. The programs utilized solitary
confinement, group confinement in close quarters, sensory deprivation, physical
force and constraint, discipline and punishment, the administration of hallucinogens and delirium-producing drugs such as LSD, and brainwashing techniques
developed by the Central Intelligence Agency in the United States. Alleging that
the treatment was unethical and illegal and that it amounted to torture, the
plaintiff sought damages for battery, negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.
In 2006, the action was reconstituted as an ordinary action with multiple plaintiffs. The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the claims as statute-barred.
Held, the motion should be dismissed; a notional cross-motion by the plaintiffs
for partial summary judgment should be granted.
When T commenced the proposed class action in 2000, s. 28 of the Class
Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6 suspended the running of any not already
expired limitation periods for her and the putative class members. At that
time, there was no limitation period for a claim of breach of fiduciary duty. The
breach of fiduciary duty claim was extant and was not subsumed within any