medical or scientific grounds and that had severely deleterious
effects on the patients at Oak Ridge. It is to be noted that in the
statement of claim, there was no malpractice or medical negligence claim, as such, advanced against Drs. Barker and Maier.
And, although bad faith might be inferred from the material
facts pleaded, neither bad faith, malice nor improper purpose
was expressly pleaded against them.
 Right from the outset of the action, the defendants raised
the issue that the plaintiffs’ causes of action were statute-barred.
 Thus, in 2001, when Ms. Taylor brought the motion to add
Mr. Joanisse, the defendants opposed the motion and argued
that his claim was statute-barred. Justice Cumming, however,
granted the motion to add Mr. Joanisse and held that the limitation issue should be dealt with on a proper record. In 2003, during the certification motion, the matter of limitation periods was
mentioned but not resolved by Justice Cullity. In 2006, after the
unsuccessful appeal of the order refusing certification, Ms. Taylor and Mr. Joanisse brought a motion to continue the action as
a multi-plaintiff proceeding, and, once again, the matter of limitation periods was mentioned but not resolved by Justice Cullity.
In 2013, the co-plaintiffs brought a motion to add five more
plaintiffs, and, once again, the defendants opposed the joinder
and submitted that the new plaintiffs’ claims were statute-barred. On the joinder motion, I held that it was not plain
and obvious that the plaintiffs’ claims were statute-barred, and
I allowed the joinder.
 The defendants now bring a summary judgment motion
to resolve once and for all the issue of whether the claims of
the 31 co-plaintiffs in the multi-plaintiff proceeding are statute-barred.
 During the hearing of the summary judgment motion, the
plaintiffs accepted, as they have throughout the action, that
there is no free-standing tort of infliction of torture, but they
asserted that their claims for breach of fiduciary duty, battery
and negligence were not statute-barred.
 During the course of the argument at the hearing,
I advised the parties that I was of the view that there were four
ways of deciding the defendants’ motion; namely, (1) grant the
motion and dismiss the plaintiffs’ action; (2) adjourn the motion
for additional evidence on matters for which there were genuine
issues requiring a trial but which issues might be resolved by
employing the forensic resources of the summary judgment rule;
(3) dismiss the motion and direct that the matter of whether the
plaintiffs’ actions were statute-barred be decided at trial; or
(4) dismiss the defendants’ summary judgment motion but grant