On January 7, 2015, the plaintiffs issued their second
fresh as amended statement of claim.
 In the reconstituted multi-plaintiff action, the plaintiffs
allege that the medical treatment they received, which was
known as social therapy, was unethical and illegal. The plaintiffs
state that they were the subjects of experimentation and torture.
In advancing their claim, among other international treaties, the
plaintiffs rely on the United Nations Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, December 10, 1984,  Can. T.S. No. 36 (entered
into force 26 June 1987), which is part of Canada’s international
human rights obligations.
 In 2013, the plaintiffs brought a motion to remove nine
plaintiffs and to add five additional plaintiffs to the action. The
defendants objected to the joinder on the grounds that the
claims were statute-barred. I concluded that at that juncture of
the proceedings, it could not be determined whether the claims
 More particularly, I concluded that pursuant to the transition provisions of the Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24,
Sch. B, the former limitation periods found in the Medical Act,
infra, the Health Disciplines Act, infra, the Mental Hospitals
Act, infra, or the Mental Health Act, infra, might arguably apply
to the claims of the five plaintiffs; however, it was not plain and
obvious that these limitation periods did apply; therefore, the
five plaintiffs should be joined without prejudice to the defendants’ right to plead that the claims are statute-barred. Accordingly, I granted the plaintiffs’ motion to amend their statement
of claim to add the additional plaintiffs. See Barker v. Barker,
 O.J. No. 5625, 2013 ONSC 7381 (S.C.J.).
 The action proceeded to examinations for discovery, and
in 2016, at a case management conference after most of the
plaintiffs were examined and arrangements were being made for
examinations of Drs. Barker and Maier, the defendants asked
for a date for a summary judgment motion on the issue of
whether the plaintiffs’ claims were statute-barred.
 I granted the request for a summary judgment motion,
and I scheduled the motion now before the court. I did so on
terms. I froze the record for the motion and limited the evidentiary record to the facts in the statement of claim that were to be
taken to be proven for the purposes of determining whether the
co-plaintiffs’ claims were statute-barred.
 For the eventuality that the motion would not be successful, I ordered the plaintiffs to set the action down for trial,
which they have done, without prejudice to their right to bring