will not be tolerated because of its impact on the profession as a whole.
As was observed by Sir Thomas Bingham M.R. in Bolton, at p. 519:
The reputation of the profession is more important than the fortunes of
any individual member. Membership of a profession brings many bene-
fits, but that is a part of the price.
Although the majority of the Appeal Division quoted this passage from Bolton, at para. 58, it does not appear to have given it
any further thought.
 In my view, Hearing Division’s consideration of general
and specific deterrence in a case where the presumptive penalty
is licence revocation was entirely reasonable.
( ii) Did the Hearing Division assess the delay
 The majority asserted the Hearing Division “misdirected
itself” as to the effect of delay on penalty in light of the “widened
formulation” of mitigating circumstances from Bishop (at paras.
48, 53 and 55).
 This is not a fair reading of the Hearing Division’s penalty
decision. The Hearing Division instructed itself correctly, at
para. 21, that it would be wrong to adopt a restrictive reading of
Mucha, in light of Bishop. After noting the holding in Bishop,
it listed the mitigating circumstances advanced by Mr. Abbott, at
para. 22. The first raised the delay issue and its effect on the
There was substantial delay in the investigation as was discussed in our
prior reasons. While we did not order a stay of proceedings as asked, it is
now submitted that the delay in this case and the attendant prejudice suf-
fered by Mr. Abbott justifies a lesser penalty than revocation[.]
 In the succeeding paragraphs, the Hearing Division ana-
lyzed each of the grounds. It addressed delay at paras. 30-31:
Finally, we address the issue of delay. We accept the submission that delay
causing prejudice can be a mitigating factor in many cases. However, we do
not accept that prejudice arising from delay in this case is a proper basis to
turn revocation into a lengthy suspension.
The first reason is that we are not persuaded that much of the prejudice
described by Mr. Abbott in his earlier evidence and during the penalty
phase arises from investigative delay as opposed to from the issuance of
the Notice of Application in the spring of 2013. The evidence of prejudice
arising from investigative delay is quite limited as discussed in our decision on finding at paras. 32 to 60. While there was no doubt some prejudice, we do not find there to have been substantial prejudice arising from
investigative delay. The evidence of prejudice was vague and general.
Mr. Abbott sought no professional assistance during the investigation.
There is no evidence from anyone about Mr. Abbott and his circumstances
during the investigation. No medical or other expert evidence was