was reasonable and entitled to deference. It rejected the appellant’s interpretation.
 The Divisional Court also found that the minister’s calculation of the amount of security was reasonable and entitled
 The Divisional Court did not address the constitutional
validity of s. 12(2)(f.1), because it was of the view that the appellant had not asserted this challenge in its application.
E. The Issues
 There are two issues raised by this appeal. The first is
whether the minister’s demand for security was unreasonable
and arbitrary. The answer to that question largely depends on
whether the appellant’s tobacco was UFCT.
 The second issue is whether s. 12(2)(f.1) is constitutionally valid or applicable to tobacco destined for export or for sale
on a reserve.
F. Overview of the Parties’ Submissions
 Dealing first with the interpretation and application of
s. 12(2)(f.1), the appellant says that the minister’s demand for
security was unreasonable and arbitrary because the minister
simply assumed that all the tobacco listed as “other tobacco”
in the appellant’s monthly returns was UFCT. According to
the appellant, over 95 per cent of the product in question (the
exported tobacco) was not UFCT, either as a matter of statutory
interpretation or as a matter of fact.
 Instead, it says that the exported tobacco was “partially
manufactured tobacco”, a term that is found nowhere in the TTA
or Regulation, but is used in the Excise Act, 2001, S.C. 2002,
c. 22. This, says the appellant, is because its exported tobacco
is not packaged in such a way that it could be sold at retail. Its
exported tobacco requires further refining before it can be sold in
a form where it would be used or consumed by a consumer and,
as such, does not constitute “fine cut tobacco” under the TTA.
 While the appellant acknowledges that it holds permits
for two types of UFCT (including the exported tobacco), it submits that the minister cannot improperly issue permits and then
demand security in respect of those permits.
 The minister makes several responses to these submissions. First, he says that having applied for and received permits
to sell UFCT, it is too late for the appellant to argue that its
product is something else. Second, he says that the exported
product falls within the statutory definition of UFCT. Third, the
appellant’s witness acknowledged that the product possessed