On the plain language of s. 12(2)(f.1), it is clear that the legislature intended
that security be provided for tax payable as a result of possible diversion of
tobacco products, and that security is not limited to taxes that will be collectable on intended taxable sales to consumers.
 Section 12(2)(f.1) should be understood as part of what
Krever J., as he then was, described as the “elaborate machinery
to be found in the [ TTA] that is designed to facilitate the collection of the tax”: see Hill, at pp. 768, 770 O.R. The security is not
imposed in relation to taxes on the sale of tobacco if used for its
intended (non-taxable) purpose. It is imposed and calculated on
the basis of the sale of the tobacco in a taxable market, because
it serves as security in the event, among others, that the tobacco
is not sold in its intended market.
 I would reject the appellant’s submission that such
security is not required because of strict federal controls on
the export of tobacco products. This is a case in which the double aspect doctrine permits both levels of government to legislate in relation to different aspects of the regulation of the
same commodity. Further, I would reject the appellant’s argument that because it has never been involved in illegal diversion of tobacco products, the security demand is unjustified.
The purpose of the legislative provision is not to single out
or punish wrongdoers; it is to proactively protect against lost
tax revenue should product be diverted out of non-taxable
markets and into the domestic market. The security requirement is imposed on every person who holds a permit to purchase or sell UFCT.
 The case of Guindon v. Canada,  3 S.C.R. 3, 
S.C.J. No. 41, 2015 SCC 41 is instructive. There, a penalty
under the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.)
(the “ITA”) had been assessed against a lawyer for issuing
an opinion letter in support of a sham charitable donation
program and for signing tax receipts on behalf of the charity.
The provision in question made it an offence to make a false
statement that could be used by or on behalf of another person
for the purpose of the ITA ; i.e., in that case, to obtain a charitable deduction.
 The appellant in Guindon argued that the provision was
criminal in nature and that she was entitled to the protection of
s. 11 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In reject-
ing her submission, the Supreme Court stated, at para. 70:
[The appellant] argues that s. 163.2(4) is not an administrative offence
because it is not restricted to the regulated class in the ITA (taxpayers) and
departs from the general purpose of the Act: the collection of tax. While the
individuals targeted by s. 163.2(4) of the ITA are not the taxpayers them-
selves, this does not detract from the provision's administrative nature. The