at paras. 16-18. The Crown’s position is contrary to established
authority interpreting s. 232 as it read prior to 2015: see R. v.
Thibert,  1 S.C.R. 37,  S.C.J. No. 2, at paras. 22-24;
and R. v. Tran,  3 S.C.R. 350,  S.C.J. No. 58, 2010
SCC 58, at para. 29.
 I think it would be doubly unfair to allow the Crown to
not only advance a position on appeal that contradicted the position taken at trial, but to also advance a position calling on this
court to reinterpret s. 232 so as to eliminate a defence that was
available as the section was interpreted at the time of the trial.
 I would not allow the Crown to argue that the defence of
provocation should not have been left with the jury at trial.
I would dismiss this ground of appeal on that basis.
Was there an air of reality to the provocation defence?
 Assuming that the Crown should be allowed to raise
this argument on appeal, I am satisfied that the defence was
properly left with the jury on the evidence adduced at trial.
 The defence of provocation must be left with a jury when
on the totality of the evidence there is a basis upon which a rea-
sonable jury could have a reasonable doubt in respect of each of
the constituent elements of the defence. This is sometimes
referred to as the “air of reality” test: R. v. Cinous, 
2 S.C.R. 3,  S.C.J. No. 28, 2002 SCC 29, at para. 54.
As explained in R. v. Cairney,  3 S.C.R. 420,  S.C.J.
No. 55, 2013 SCC 55, at para. 21:
“[T]he air of reality test [is not] intended to assess whether the defence is
likely, unlikely, somewhat likely, or very likely to succeed at the end of the
day.” The question is whether a properly instructed jury acting reasonably
could have a reasonable doubt as to whether the elements of the defence of
provocation are made out. The trial judge may engage in a limited weighing
of the totality of the evidence to determine if a jury acting reasonably on
that evidence could draw the inferences necessary to have a reasonable
doubt as to whether the accused is guilty of murder, on the basis of the
defence of provocation[.]
 In this case, the evidentiary basis for the provocation
defence came largely from the evidence of Mr. Suarez-Noa. In
considering whether the defence should be left, the trial judge
must assume the truth of that evidence: see R. v. Pappas, 
3 S.C.R. 452,  S.C.J. No. 56, 2013 SCC 56, at para. 27.
 Provocation has both an objective and subjective component. The objective component captured by the “ordinary person”
inquiry recognizes that there is a minimum level of self-control
demanded of all persons in the community. An accused who is in