There was no objection by the Crown to any part of
Dr. Gojer’s testimony during his examination-in-chief. The cross-examination took three principle tacks. First, the Crown established that several of the personality traits revealed in the personality testing done for Dr. Gojer were capable of undermining
the psychological portrait of Mr. Suarez-Noa painted during
Dr. Gojer’s examination-in-chief. For example, Mr. Suarez-Noa
was said to fit the profile of a person who had significant inter-personal and marital conflicts and who was always quick to project blame on the other party.
 Second, the Crown demonstrated that Dr. Gojer did not
review all of the information available to him before giving testimony. For example, he did not watch the entire interview
Mr. Suarez-Noa had with the police. He also was not in court
when Mr. Suarez-Noa testified. The Crown attempted to demonstrate that parts of Mr. Suarez-Noa’s testimony, particularly his
evidence about his reaction to the “fucking immigrant” comment, were quite different than what Mr. Suarez-Noa had told
Dr. Gojer. The Crown argued that to the extent that the evidence
differed from Dr. Gojer’s understanding, Dr. Gojer’s opinion
must be rejected.
 Third, the Crown cross-examined Dr. Gojer to show that
Mr. Suarez-Noa had given significantly different versions of the
same events. The Crown used this aspect of Dr. Gojer’s evidence
to attack Mr. Suarez-Noa’s credibility.
 Not surprisingly, Dr. Gojer’s evidence figured prominently
in defence counsel’s closing address. The trial judge also referred
to his evidence. The jury asked to rehear Dr. Gojer’s evidence in
its entirety during their deliberations.
The applicable law
 Opinion evidence, including expert opinion evidence,
is presumptively inadmissible: R. v. Abbey (2009), 97 O.R. (3d)
330,  O.J. No. 3534, 2009 ONCA 624, at para. 71, leave to
appeal to S.C.C. refused  S.C.C.A. No. 125. To be admissible, expert opinion evidence must satisfy certain preconditions to
admissibility and also survive a cost/benefit analysis by the trial
judge. At this second stage, the trial judge decides whether
having regard to the risks inherent in admitting expert evidence,
the benefits to the fact-finding process in the specific case warrant
the admission of that evidence: White Burgess Langille Inman v.
Abbott and Haliburton Co.,  2 S.C.R. 182,  S.C.J. No.
23, 2015 SCC 23, at para. 24; and Abbey, at paras. 76-79.
 The Crown submits that Dr. Gojer’s evidence should have
been excluded for two reasons. First, his evidence was not