(b) trading in securities without being registered: R. v. Richardson (1981) 34 O.R. (2d) 348,  O.J. No. 2511 (Div.
Ct.), affd on appeal (1982), 39 O.R. (2d) 438,  O.J. No.
3106, 68 C.C.C. (2d) 447 (C.A.) and leave to appeal to S.C.C.
refused  1 S.C.R. viii,  S.C.C.A. No. 394; R. v.
Buck River Resources,  A.J. No. 1248 (Q.B.); R. v.
Boyle,  A.J. No. 70, 290 A.R. 201 (Prov. Ct.); and R. v.
Kelly,  B.C.J. No. 1349, 13 C.C.L.S. 169 (Prov. Ct.).
 The issue of whether offences under the Act are strict
liability offences was specifically considered in R. v. Maitland
Capital Ltd. (2011), 105 O.R. (3d) 503,  O.J. No. 1513,
2011 ONCJ 168 and found to be strict liability offences
[at paras. 91-93]:
With respect to mens rea, it is clear that offences under the Ontario Secu-
rities Act are matters of strict liability, meaning that the accused are not
liable if they prove that they were duly diligent in complying with the Act.
The leading definition of a strict liability offence was established as follows
in R. v. Sault Ste. Marie (City),  2 S.C.R. 1299,  S.C.J. No. 59,
at p. 1326 S.C.R.:
Offences in which there is no necessity for the prosecution to prove the
existence of mens rea; the doing of the prohibited act prima facie im-
ports the offence, leaving it open to the accused to avoid liability by
proving that he took all reasonable care. This involves consideration of
what a reasonable man would have done in the circumstances. The
defence will be available if the accused reasonably believed in a mis-
taken set of facts which, if true, would render the act or omission inno-
cent, or if he took all reasonable steps to avoid the particular event.
These offences may properly be called offences of strict liability.
In R. v. Armaugh Corp.,  O.J. No. 4360 (C.J.), at para. 31, Westman J.
adopted the reasoning in R. v. Richardson (1981), 34 O.R. (2d) 348, 
O.J. No. 2511 (Div. Ct.) in ruling that securities offences are offences of strict
The purpose of the prohibition against trading in securities by a
person who is not registered under the Act is, as Steele J. points out,
to protect the investing public from being defrauded. That purpose puts
the contravention of the prohibition in the category of a public welfare
offence and it is now clear that public welfare offences, again as Steele
J. says, are prima facie strict liability offences. [page 524]
As submitted repeatedly by the prosecution, the purposes of the Act are as
stated in Armaugh, supra, and the Securities Act, s. 1.1 — namely, the pro-
tection of the public, and the fostering of fair and efficient capital markets.
 The appellants’ analogy with “contempt” proceedings is
misplaced. Contempt proceedings have always required that,
to establish contempt, the court must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged contemnor had knowledge of the