moral blameworthiness of the offenders was nevertheless high.
Dishonesty in carrying out the offences is relevant. Sentencing
requires a consideration of the moral blameworthiness of the
offender. It was entirely appropriate to consider the means and
methods used by Campbell and DaSilva to carry out the offences
as aggravating factors.
 Campbell’s counsel submits that there was no basis to
infer knowledge of the fraudulent nature of the Ameron operation. I disagree. While there was conflicting evidence as to
whether other traders believed that the Ameron was a legitimate business, it was open to the learned trial judge to conclude
that Campbell, using a fictitious name (different from even the
other fictitious names used) knew of the illegitimate Ameron
operations. Besides, as the learned judge set out in his reasons,
Campbell admitted the operations were fraudulent.
 Campbell’s counsel submits that the learned trial judge
failed to give appropriate weight, as a mitigating factor, that
once Campbell knew of the fraudulent Ameron operation, he
stopped working there and alerted investors. The sentencing
judge found that Campbell admitted it was a fraudulent boiler
room operation. The difficulty with the defence submission is
that Campbell suggested in his submissions that it wasn’t him
that selected the false name of Dave Bell; that they at Ameron
office, the operators wouldn’t let him take any document home to
check with a lawyer; that he didn’t sell anything except “I might
have got about $500” — “I was upset ’cause they wasted my
time”. All of these factors would have made it clear, particularly
with Campbell’s background, that he either needed direct
or clear answers to such questions or the operation was a
“scam”. This appellant submission do not place Campbell on the
moral high ground when it comes to his involvement in trading
 The appellant’s counsel also submits that the learned trial
judge erred in giving sufficient weight to the small amount of
the investor losses and assumed that the money forwarded to
Zap Group was proceeds of trades. The learned trial judge was
fully aware of this factor and specifically refers to it in his reasons for sentence. Had this been a first breach of the Act, this
would have had been a more persuasive argument, but all relevant factors including the prior breaches of the Act are proper
 The appellants submit that the sentences were not a fit
and proper sentence and point to R. v. Bandali,  O.J. No.
6123, 2015 ONCJ 652 and Ontario (Securities Commission) v.
Robinson (2011), 105 O.R. (3d) 120,  O.J. No. 852, 2011