The fire marshal’s evidence
 The appellant submits that the trial judge erred by withdrawing from the jury’s consideration Olson’s evidence regarding
the time and conditions required to incinerate a human body.
This evidence was central to his defence and formed a fundamental feature of the defence’s closing address. The withdrawal
during the final instructions was highly prejudicial to the appellant’s fair trial rights. The Crown did not object when the
evidence was being called. It was too late to object after the close
of the evidence. Further, the appellant submits that the trial
judge eviscerated the exculpatory evidence when he instructed
the jury that there was “no scientific evidence” to consider in
determining the length of time or amount of wood required to
burn a body.
 To some extent, I agree with the appellant. The judge’s
charge to the jury went too far in declaring that there was no
scientific evidence. Olson did testify about matters other than
the impugned textbook reference. In particular, Olson was
equivocal in his evidence as to the time and amount of wood. He
said there were too many variables and would not venture an
opinion. This was evidence that assisted the defence.
 Although I agree that the trial judge went too far when
he said there was no scientific evidence, the error was of no
moment. First, he referred to the equivocal nature of Olson’s
evidence and the fact that there were several variables in play.
Second, the reference to no scientific evidence was responsive
only to defence counsel’s submission to the jury that the timing
and the amount of wood had been scientifically proven. The trial
judge’s charge on this issue, read as a whole, is fair to the
defence. Third, Olson did not adopt the contents of the article on
cremation. The text does not, in any event, demonstrate what
the appellant says it does. There were — as Olson said — too
many variables to make this determination.
 I would not give effect to this ground of appeal.
Evidence of Huard
 The appellant submits that the trial judge erred in admitting the evidence of Huard because it required circular
reasoning to be admissible and because the prejudicial effect
outweighed its probative value. The Crown argues that evidence
of the appellant’s plot to kill the only eye-witness to the murder
was probative and properly admitted, as was evidence of plots to
kill witnesses in several other cases: R. v. McCullough, 
O.J. No. 32, 142 C.C.C. (3d) 149 (C.A.); R. v. Lawrence,