want his children to be inculcated in the view that acceptance of
other persons requires full endorsement of all of their choices,
such as same-sex marriage, which the appellant does not endorse.
 What I glean from this evidence is that the appellant fears
that his children will be persuaded to abandon the insights of
their religion if the moral positions taken in the policy materials
receive the active endorsement of their teachers, which the appellant characterized as a “value judgment” on the sensitive topic.
 This is a legitimate fear, as Dr. Watson made clear in his
Report of the Ministerial Inquiry on Religious Education in
Ontario Public Elementary Schools quoted earlier. The mores
contained in the s. 169.1 program can conflict with parental religious views, particularly if it is premised on the proposition that
true acceptance of another person can only be achieved by
embracing all of their self-understandings.
 The appellant has demonstrated that the school board’s
decision to refuse the accommodation he sought could act to
limit his freedom of religion. His claim meets the first half of the
first step of the Doré/Loyola framework: his religious freedom is
( 6) Has the appellant proven substantial interference with
his freedom of religion?
 It is not necessarily contrary to a parent’s freedom of religion for children to be exposed to ideas that contradict those of the
parents. Some kinds of “cognitive dissonance” can be acceptable,
as McLachlin C.J.C. explained in Chamberlain, at paras. 64-67.
See, also, LeBel J., at paras. 211-12; and Gonthier J. in dissent
but not on this point, at para. 184, L. (S.), Deschamps J., at
para. 40, LeBel J., at para. 54; and see generally, Loyola. However,
acceptability depends on the purpose and effect of the challenged
educational program, and also the age of the children involved.
 If the purpose of the challenged educational program is to
undermine the religious beliefs of school children, then the program, and any decisions made to instantiate it, would limit the
freedom of religion of the parents unacceptably and beyond the
capacity to justify under s. 1 of the Charter: R. v. Big M Drug
Mart Ltd., supra, at para. 88. Sometimes, as the Supreme Court
found in Loyola, the infringing purpose is easily found on the
face of the policy. That is not this case. The appellant has put
forward no expert evidence that the s.169.1 program set by the
Ministry of Education and implemented by the school board has
such a purpose.
 However, if the effect of the s. 169.1 program were to
undermine the efforts of parents to transmit the tenets of