religious faith to their children, that would also limit the religious freedom rights of parents and engage their s. 2(a) Charter
right to freedom of religion, subject to justification under s. 1 of
the Charter. The parents bear the burden proving this limiting
effect objectively on the balance of probabilities: L. (S.), at paras.
2, 23-24. The burden of justifying the limit is on the state actor.
 In this case, the appellant has not put forward any objective evidence that the school board’s decision to refuse accommodation is functioning to undermine his ability to transmit the
precepts of his religion, including teachings about human sexuality, to his children. There is no evidence that his children have
experienced negative teacher “value judgments” of the sort he
fears, over the many years this case has been pending. Nor has
he put forward expert evidence detailing the way in which the
s. 169.1 program actually operates that would have this negative
effect on his ability to transmit his religious faith to his children
in the absence of the accommodation he seeks. The lack of such
evidence is fatal to the appellant’s appeal, which must be dismissed on that basis.
 Dismissing this appeal does not, however, give the
s. 169.1 program a clean constitutional bill of health. Were there
evidence that the s. 169.1 program undermined a parent’s ability
to transmit religious faith, together with a refusal to provide
accommodation, the result might well be different.
 To return to the question posed at the outset of these reasons, in my view there are limits imposed by the Charter on a
province’s power to use publicly funded education to inculcate
children in beliefs that educational authorities have determined
are necessary; these limits cannot be specified in advance except
very generally, as I have done. To repeat the words of La Forest
J. in Jones, at para. 25: “Those who administer the Province’s
educational requirements may not do so in a manner that
unreasonably infringes on the right of the parents to teach their
children in accordance with their religious convictions.” See, also,
Christian Education South Africa, Sachs J., at para. 35.
 In these circumstances, I would take LeBel J.’s approach
in L. (S.), at para. 58, and decline to rule definitively on the constitutionality of the s. 169.1 program. It would not be hard to
imagine that a tweak to the program would pose a problem, or to
imagine a teacher actively using both the force of personality
and approved curriculum materials to undermine the faith
commitments of students, which could make the provision of
accommodation necessary. But that is not the case here.
 In light of these considerations, the court does not reach
the second stage of the Doré analysis, which would address