( 7) Reflections on the application of Doré/Loyola to line
 The doctrinal methodology for determining whether a
limit placed on a Charter right is justified shifts from context to
context. In the context of Charter rights challenges to statutes,
the test from R. v. Oakes,  1 S.C.R. 103,  S.C.J. No. 7
gives prima facie priority to the Charter right claim, placing the
burden on the state actor to establish, among other things, that
the reasons for enacting the impugned statutory provision are
sufficiently compelling to justify the limit placed on the right.
Charter rights thus have a defeasible priority over statutory
objectives. This priority is also reflected in the minimal impairment requirement, as Dickson C.J.C. noted: “The limiting
measures . . . must impair the right as little as possible”:
Edwards Books, at p. 768 S.C.R.
 In Doré, Abella J. was reflecting on the proper approach
to “an adjudicated administrative decision”, at para. 4. But in
Loyola, the analysis is made to apply to a discretionary decision
that is not adjudicated. The shift in doctrine from Doré to Loyola
is not a small one.
 The Doré/Loyola framework is intended to adapt the s. 1
justificatory methodology to the assessment of potential Charter
infringement by decisions of administrative decision makers.
I have concerns that this project miscarries in para. 4 of Loyola,
which both the application judge and my colleague invoke.
 Abella J. states, in para. 4 of Loyola, that, under Doré,
“the discretionary decision-maker is required to proportionately
balance the Charter protections to ensure that they are limited
no more than is necessary given the applicable statutory objectives that she or he is obliged to pursue”. The language used
by Abella J. seems to suggest that the statutory objectives have
indefeasible priority over Charter rights, contrary to the Oakes
methodology. Perhaps the logic of para. 4 is that if a statutory
objective is pressing and substantial (understood in the Oakes
sense), that would be sufficient to justify the limit of the Charter
right, irrespective of any countervailing considerations. See
Doré, para. 6. I am uncertain.
Other difficulties with the Doré/Loyola framework
 The context of the underlying decision under appeal
raises some methodological problems. The Doré/Loyola framework cannot easily be applied to a line decision made by several
educators who were not operating in a context that would yield