Third, who is called upon to exercise the “justificatory
muscles” to which Abella J. refers in para. 5 of Doré, when there
is no adjudication at the moment of the challenged decision?
 Fourth, what sort of justification must the line decision
maker offer for the challenged decision? Is it to be provided at
the moment of decision, or is it in the hands of creative lawyers
when the decision is challenged judicially? In my view, in order
to justify a Charter limit, the record of evidence considered by
the line decision maker should demonstrate the elements of
accountability, intelligibility, adequacy and transparency courts
expect from administrative tribunals.
 Finally, what is the applicable standard of review? Is it
to be “reasonableness” as the “deferential standard”, derived
from Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick,  1 S.C.R. 190, 
S.C.J. No. 9, 2008 SCC 9, at para. 47? This is implied in Doré, at
para. 47, but that was in relation to a regulator functioning in
an adjudicative setting, not to a line decision maker.
 Can these decision makers be considered expert in the
manner generally understood by administrative law to justify a
deferential standard of review? Within a narrow professional
compass, individual school board employees can have a measure
of expertise in the education profession, acquired by qualifications and training, and by experience, but these vary among
individuals. When they are confronted with the claim that their
decision is not sufficiently respectful of Charter rights, will they
understand how to reason from constitutional principles?
 Further, can we be sure that these line decision makers
will inevitably be impartial and fair, even when their own decisions are challenged? Can we be sure that their supervisors, also
being human, will be impartial and fair, and not defensive of the
conduct of their subordinates? The administration of justice has
developed numerous mechanisms to ensure impartiality and
fairness on the part of decision makers, but none of them apply
to discretionary line decision makers.
 Where a person challenges the decision of a line official
on the basis that it violates a Charter right, there is every prospect that the first impartial decision maker in the sequence will
be a court or other adjudicative tribunal.
 I would be reluctant to apply a robust concept of “
reasonableness” burdened by a standing obligation of judicial deference to a line decision maker’s discretionary decision. There is a
real risk that a claimant’s Charter rights will not be understood
and will not be given effect by the line decision maker. I would
prefer a more sensitive application of the nostrum that “
reasonableness ‘takes its colour from the context’, and ‘must be