containing various documents and forms submitted by Mr.
Alguire (through Mr. Elias) and reviewed by members of Manulife’s underwriting and other processing departments. No document produced referenced inflation protection.
[ 17] Second, the trial judge’s conclusion is supported by
his finding that Mr. Elias accepted the quote on behalf of
Mr. Alguire. I see no error in the trial judge’s holding that
Mr. Elias was acting as Mr. Alguire’s agent in securing and
agreeing to the quote. The jurisprudence is clear that an insurance agent may be a dual agent, acting for both the insured
and the insurer: Gilmore Farm Supply Inc. v. Waterloo Mutual
Insurance Co.,  O.J. No. 222, 3 C.C.L.I. 221 (H.C.J.), at
paras. 31-32, vard on other grounds,  O.J. No. 2431,
6 C.C.L.I. 288 (H.C.J.); Farrant (Litigation guardian of) v. Low,
 O.J. No. 449, 77 A.C. W.S. (3d) 419 (Gen. Div.), at para. 49.
[ 18] With regard to the agency issue, Mr. Alguire’s appeal
counsel, Mr. Griffin, advanced a new argument not made to the
trial judge that s. 199 of the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 218,
which was in effect at the time the policy was issued, operates
as a legal bar to a finding that Mr. Elias acted as Mr. Alguire’s
agent. That section provides:
199. No officer, agent or employee of an insurer and no person soliciting
insurance, whether or not he is an agent of the insurer, shall, to the prejudice of the insured, be deemed to be the agent of the insured in respect of
any question arising out of a contract.
[ 19] I am not persuaded that s. 199 or its equivalent in the current Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I. 8, being s. 222, assist the
appellant in the circumstances of this case. It cannot be said that
in securing the quote, Mr. Elias was acting to the prejudice of
Mr. Alguire. To the contrary, he was acting in accordance with
his instructions. Mr. Elias’ actions could only be considered prejudicial to Mr. Alguire if Mr. Alguire’s evidence about wanting to
secure inflation protection was accepted by the trial judge. It
[ 20] Third, the finding of an antecedent agreement is also consistent with the trial judge’s interpretation of Mr. Alguire’s affidavit evidence to the effect that Mr. Elias presented the quote
before he executed the policy. Although Mr. Alguire submits that
the trial judge misinterpreted that evidence, I am of the view
that the trial judge’s interpretation was open to him. By agreeing to the policy, which was supposed to be consistent with the
quote, Mr. Alguire ratified Mr. Elias’ acceptance of the quote.
[ 21] Fourth, in considering whether there was sufficient evidence of an antecedent agreement, it is important to consider
the trial judge’s rejection of Mr. Alguire’s testimony. There were