Interpretation of this section has established a two-part
analysis. First, there must be an infringement of life, liberty or
security of the person. Second, that infringement must be inconsistent with the principles of fundamental justice (Blencoe v.
British Columbia (Human Rights Commission),  2 S.C.R.
307,  S.C.J. No. 43, 2000 SCC 44, para. 47).
 The applicant asserts that the administrative segregation
legislative scheme constitutes a deprivation of liberty and of
security of the person. The applicant asserts three reasons why
the legislative scheme is not in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice. The first is that it is grossly disproportionate. The second is that it is arbitrary. The third is that it is procedurally unfair.
 The first ground has been dealt with under R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine,  3 S.C.R. 571,  S.C.J. No. 79,
2003 SCC 74 and will be considered when s. 12 of the Charter is
 However, the courts have also held that it is appropriate
to consider the administrative decision-maker’s independence
under s. 7 of the Charter in a prison context (R. v. Shubley,
 1 S.C.R. 3,  S.C.J. No. 1, pp. 23-24 S.C.R.; Morin v.
Saskatoon Correctional Centre,  S.J. No. 462, 86 Sask. R.
269 (Q.B.), at para. 8).
 Although the parties agree that administrative segregation
constitutes a depravation of liberty, they dispute the severity of
this deprivation. The applicant maintains that it constitutes “the
most serious deprivation of liberty”. The respondent argues that it
is only a deprivation of a residual liberty interest.
 Deprivation of even a residual liberty interest will engage
habeas corpus. See R. v. Miller,  2 S.C.R. 613,  S.C.J.
No. 79, at p. 637 S.C.R. and Gogan v. Canada (Attorney General),  A.J. No. 1052, 2017 ABQB 609, at paras. 43-51.
 Admitting or maintaining an inmate in administrative
segregation amounts to a significant deprivation of liberty. It
amounts to placing the inmate in a prison located within the
prison. The Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Boone,  O.J.
No. 3173, 2014 ONCA 515, 312 C.C.C. (3d) 27, at para. 3, noted
that a transfer to administrative segregation is a serious deprivation of liberty. Specifically, the court stated: “There has been
a growing recognition over the last half-century that solitary
confinement is a very severe form of incarceration and one that
has a lasting psychological impact on prisoners.”