I am satisfied that it is reasonable to believe that preventing inmates, who are a danger to others, endangered themselves or potentially an obstruction to a serious investigation,
from associating with the general inmate population is rationally connected to these objectives.
 I am not satisfied that administrative expediency justi-fies a one decision-maker model. Section 1 may for reasons of
expediency justify a s. 7 infringement but only in exceptional
conditions such as natural disasters, the outbreak of war, etc.
See Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) S 94 (2),
supra, at para. 93. This is not such a case.
 The lack of an independent review means that there is
virtually no accountability for the decision to segregate. Further,
this lack of accountability occurs within a legislative scheme in
which there is no cap on the length of time an inmate can spend
in segregation, despite calls for a cap for a long time. For example, the Arbour report and the Coroner’s Jury in the Ashley
Smith Inquest recommended the abolition of indefinite isolation.
 Providing for an independent review of the decision to
segregate does not increase the risk of harm to persons working
in the penitentiary or the inmates housed there because the
inmate is segregated at the time of the review and a wrong
decision by the institutional head to continue segregation protects no one.
 Accordingly, I am not satisfied that insulating the institutional head from meaningful review falls within a range of
reasonable alternatives for reviewing the decision to continue
segregation. In addition, for the same reason the deleterious
effects of not providing an independent review are not proportional to the objectives of the administrative segregation regime.
 Finally, as indicated, the lack of an independent review
is not rationally connected to the legislated purposes for permitting administrative segregation.
 For these reasons, I am satisfied that the lack of an
independent review of the decision to segregate more than minimally impairs the inmate’s liberty and security of the person
interests and that as a result the infringement, caused by this
aspect of ss. 31-37 of the Corrections and Conditional Release
Act, is not saved by s. 1 of the Charter.
What is an Independent Review?
 Because the harmful effects of segregation can manifest
in as little as 48 hours it is not practical to view habeas corpus
as a sufficient remedy.