By independence, I mean freedom from control by or
subordination to the decision maker. See, for example, the reference to Fawcett, The Application of the European Convention on
Human Rights (Clarendon Press, 1969) contained in R. v.
Valente,  2 S.C.R. 673,  S.C.J. No. 77, at p. 686
 The respondent relies on Morin v. Saskatoon Correctional Centre, supra, for the assertion that the principles of fundamental justice do not require the full protections of s. 11(d) of the
Charter, however, that does not mean that some indices of independence and impartiality are not required.
 The applicant at p. 68 of its factum seems to suggest
that the Correctional Service of Canada cannot conduct the
review, if it is to be an independent review.
 I do not accept this submission.
 The prison environment can call for swift solutions; the
negative psychological effects from administrative segregation
can present quickly. A review which is not timely and, therefore,
ineffective is no review at all. There is a trade-off between expeditious dispute resolution and the full protection of procedural
rights. The reviewing tribunal can have adequate independence
without having all the attributes of a judge. The only realistic
way to conduct a timely review of the decision to segregate is if
the review is an administrative review provided by the Correctional Service of Canada.
 The reviewing tribunal can be independent without having all the attributes of a judge.
 The administrative review of the decision can be independent and impartial if the reviewer is
— not chosen by the person whose decision is being reviewed;
— not reporting to the person whose decision is being
— completely outside the circle of influence of the person
whose decision is being reviewed; and
— given the need for a prompt decision, able to substitute
its decision for that of the person whose decision is being
 I am satisfied that this type of independence would
satisfy a fully informed reasonable observer. See Muhammad v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),  F.C.J.
No. 477, 2014 FC 448, at paras. 127 et seq.