The Other Issues Raised in this Application
 While this determination is sufficient to conclude this
application, I propose to address the other issues raised by this
Administrative Segregation is Not Contrary to s. 11(h) of the
 Section 11(h) of the Charter provides as follows:
11. Any person charged with an offence has the right
. . . . .
(h) if finally acquitted of the offence, not to be tried for it again and, if
finally found guilty and punished for the offence, not to be tried or
punished for it again[.]
 The applicant submits that s. 31(3) of the Corrections
and Conditional Release Act violates s. 11(h) of the Charter
because it can be used to segregate and thereby punish inmates
who have done nothing to threaten the safety of the institution
or any other person. The applicant submits that placing an
inmate in administrative segregation in this circumstance
changes the nature of the inmate’s incarceration and imposes a
harsher sanction than that contemplated at sentencing.
 This submission presents two types of situations: an
inmate requesting administrative segregation for his or her own
protection from the prison population and voluntarily entering
administrative segregation and an inmate involuntarily placed
in administrative segregation for his or her own protection.
 These two situations were reflected in the evidence.
 Specifically, as indicated, the applicant filed the affidavit
of Professor Juan Méndez, formerly, the United Nations special
rapporteur on torture, in which he states, at para. 55, that
LGBTI inmates “may be placed in solitary confinement at their
own request or at the discretion of prison officials”. In addition,
one of the inmate affiants (JH) was in administrative segregation on a prior occasion at his own request. See respondent’s
second supplementary application record, p. 95. Warden Pyke
indicated in his cross examination that the presence of incompatible inmates at an institution will result in the involuntary
segregation of one of the inmates until an alternative placement
or other solution is found.
 The applicant relies on Whaling v. Canada (Attorney
General),  1 S.C.R. 392,  S.C.J. No. 20, 2014 SCC 20.
In that case, Mr. Whaling was serving a penitentiary sentence.
As a first-time non-violent offender, he was eligible for accelerated