During her testimony, Cora described two telephone conversations with representatives of the plan administrator soon
after John’s death. Initially, she was told she would soon start
receiving survivor benefits. When nothing arrived, she placed
a second call. Cora recalled being impolitely told that she was
not eligible to receive anything under the plan.
 Cora’s lawyer and the plan’s administrator exchanged let-
ters in 2003. The disagreement continued. Cora wrote directly to
the president and CEO of the CNR in 2005. Once again, her
request was denied. The April 7, 2005 response referenced rule
6(6) and continued:
When John . . . died in 2003 you did not hold the legal status as his widow
because you divorced in 1992.
 Subsequent requests were met with the same response.
This action was commenced on February 14, 2012.
 CNR defends on two grounds: first, CNR maintains that
the proceeding was not commenced within the period allowed by
the Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sch. B (the “
limitations issue”); and second, CNR argues that the wording incorporated into the plan does not extend to Cora (the “interpretation
issue”). I will deal with the defences in turn.
C. The Limitations Issue
 As mentioned, John died on September 3, 2003. Cora
requested survivor benefits soon afterward. A previous lawyer
corresponded with the administrator of the plan later that year.
 It is undisputed that on its face this action was com-
menced after expiration of the applicable limitation period.
However, counsel for the plaintiff argues that a claim can be
pursued for the period from February 14, 2010 onward because
CNR breached a continuing obligation under the plan. He sub-
mitted that a fresh cause of action accrued each month a pay-
ment was not made. “Rolling” limitation periods have been
recognized by the court. As Huscroft J.A. wrote in Pickering
Square Inc. v. Trillium College Inc.,  O.J. No. 1118, 2016
ONCA 179, at para. 37:
The accrual of fresh causes of action has consequences for the innocent
party as well as the party in breach of the contract. It sets the clock running
for a new two-year limitation period.2
2 The plaintiff also relied on Christian v. Zurich Indemnity Co. of Canada
(2002), 59 O.R. (3d) 141,  O.J. No. 1014 (S.C.J.) and Economical
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Zurich Insurance Co. (2014), 122 O.R. (3d) 666,
 O.J. No. 4166 (S.C.J.).