As a general approach to statutory interpretation, every
statutory or other legislative provision is presumed to have
intelligible meaning: Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 5th ed. (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2008), at p. 1; R. v.
A. (A.),  O.J. No. 4016, 2015 ONCA 558, at para. 67. Each
provision should be read, to the extent possible, “harmoniously
with the scheme of the Act”: R. v. Hutchinson,  1 S.C.R.
346,  S.C.J. No. 19, at para. 16.
 The applicant’s reading of the Act and the OAP 1 is that
they are hopelessly at variance with each other and internally.
For the applicant, s. 277(1.1)2 of the Act establishes priority for
insurance coverage for the insurers of listed drivers even where
that coverage is not available under OAP 1. Also, in the applicant’s interpretation the OPCF 27 endorsement makes available
extra coverage for listed drivers that they will never need
since they are already covered under OAP 1 in the same way as
named insureds. None of this would make for a sensible or
meaningful legislative scheme.
 For the respondent, s. 277(1.1) of the Act sets out the
priorities among available insurance coverages for a person
involved in an accident with a rental car, but does not itself provide any insurance coverage that is not already available to the
insured. Thus, for example, the first loss insurer described in
s. 277(1.1)2 only applies to listed drivers who are not named
insureds but who have purchased extra coverage under endorsement OPCF 27. This amounts to a meaningful legislative
scheme whose parts coordinate sensibly with each other.
 In my view, s. 277(1.1)2 of the Act is not applicable to a
driver in Ms. Perets’ situation. And since Ms. Perets is not a
named insured under her father’s insurance policy, s. 277(1.1)1 is
also not applicable to her. Section 277(1.1)3 is the section of the
Act that is applicable to Ms. Perets here. Liability coverage falls to
the applicant’s insurer as the loss insurer under s. 277(1.1)3.
 The application is therefore dismissed.
 Counsel for the respondent has provided a bill of costs in
which he seeks a total of $4,529.15 for the entire application.
That is a modest and reasonable costs request. In fact, it is
about half of what the applicant would request had it been the
successful party. It is certainly within the range of the applicant’s reasonable expectations for costs: see rule 15.01(1)(0.b) of
the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194.
 The applicant shall pay the respondent $4,529.15 as costs
of this application, inclusive of all fees, disbursements and HST.