No. 298, 2007 ONCA 59, at para. 52. This too militates against
adopting the correctness standard of review simply because
a contract uses a word found in other agreements.
 Accordingly, the trial judge’s interpretation of s. 18.6
of the Subcontract attracts the deferential Sattva standard of
The trial judge’s interpretation of s. 18.6 of the Subcontract
 Sapient contends the trial judge made numerous errors in
interpreting s. 18.6: ( i) he failed to determine the parties’ intentions in accordance with the language they used; ( ii) he read one
part of s. 18.6 — “direct damages” — in isolation, without construing the contract as a whole; ( iii) he ignored the ordinary and
grammatical meaning of the clause, including the disjunctive
language used; ( iv) his interpretation deprived the phrase “loss
of profits” of any meaning; ( v) he failed to consider the clause in
relation to a similar (but not identical) clause in the prime contract between Sapient and Enbridge; and ( vi) he did not have
regard to the overall commercial context of the Subcontract.
 I would not accept these submissions. Sapient’s long list
of purported errors simply reflects its disagreement with the
trial judge’s detailed analysis, at paras. 356 to 361 of the reasons, reproduced above. Sapient would have interpreted s. 18.6
in a different fashion. So be it. Reasonable people can disagree
about the meaning of some contractual provisions.
 But Sattva and its successors are premised on the inevitability of reasonable disagreements about the interpretation of
provisions in a non-standard form contract. Where, as in this
case, the trial judge gives a considered, detailed, and context-sensitive explanation about how he arrived at the specific interpretation, and his analysis is not marked by a rare extricable
error of law or palpable and overriding errors of fact, then an
appellate court should defer to his interpretation. That another
interpretation might reasonably be available does not provide
a basis for appellate intervention.
 Accordingly, I would not give effect to this ground of
VI. Summary on the Appeal from Damages
 I conclude the trial judge erred in his assessment of the
damages for the termination of DC services. Instead of awarding damages based upon the balance owing for DC services
($2,404,000), he should have applied the formula contained in
s. 17.4 of the Subcontract. However, I see no basis for appellate