2011 varied from a high of 4.5 per cent in the first quarter of
2008 to 3.3 per cent in the final quarter of 2008 and 0.5 per cent
for six quarters in 2009 and 2010. The plaintiff relies on the varying default rate in her calculation of the suggested “blended
rate” of 3.15 per cent.
i) Decision at trial in Cobb
 The plaintiff argues that this case is similar, if not identical, to the fact situation before the trial judge in Cobb. In that
case, the trial judge exercised his discretion and awarded prejudgment interest at the rate of 3 per cent (a blended rate:
see Cobb v. Long Estate,  O.J. No. 6878, 2015 ONSC 6799,
261 A.C. W.S. (3d) 103 (S.C.J.)).
 The defendant submits that Cobb is distinguishable on its
facts. I agree.
 First, there is the timing of the decision of the trial judge
in Cobb — in terms of the trial judge’s schedule and the status of
the appeal in El-Khodr. The trial judge in Cobb was aware that
the decision of the trial judge in El-Khodr was under appeal as
related to the latter’s conclusion that the amendment does not
 The trial judge in Cobb retired two days after hearing the
submissions on prejudgment interest. His historical practice was
to defer the release of a decision until after the decision in the
pending appeal of a relevant case was released. With no date yet
set for the appeal in El-Khodr, however, the trial judge in Cobb
was concerned that he would be functus by the time the appeal
decision was released.
 In that setting, the trial judge in Cobb exercised his discretion to award prejudgment interest based on a blended rate.
In doing so, he considered a number of the factors pursuant to
s. 130(2) of the CJA. At para. 24 of his ruling, the trial judge
highlighted that there had been no advance payment (factor (c)).
He considered “the overall circumstances of the case” (factor (b)).
The trial judge did not identify any other factors enumerated in
s. 130(2) of the CJA.
 The trial judge noted that seven years had passed from
the date of the collision to the date of trial. That is the same
number of years that passed between the date of the collision
and the date of the trial in the action before me.
 There was no finding made by the trial judge in Cobb
that either of the parties contributed in any way to a delay in
the progress of the action over that seven-year period. There is
no evidence in the matter before me to support a finding that