either of the parties contributed to a delay in the progress of
 A second distinguishing feature of Cobb is that on the
appeal the defendant estate did not take issue with the blended
interest rate of 3 per cent. At trial, the defendant had submitted
that the prejudgment interest rate should be 0.5 per cent (the
default rate). The plaintiff had requested a rate of 5 per cent.
 Third, the non-pecuniary general damages awarded in
Cobb were $220,000. That amount is approximately double the
amount awarded to the plaintiff in the action before me, when
$125,000 is reduced by 10 per cent for contributory negligence.
 In summary, the trial decision in Cobb does not support
the exercise of my discretion with respect to the prejudgment
ii) Section 130(2) of the CJA
 I turn to the factors enumerated in s. 130(2) of the CJA
and address them in order. Factor (a) is changes in market rates.
Neither party led any evidence as to changes in market rates
from either 2010 or 2012 to the spring of 2017. There is no evidence before me of the potential returns on investment the
plaintiff could have achieved, from 2010 or 2012 to the spring of
2017, if she had use of the non-pecuniary damages awarded.
I am therefore not in a position to consider factor (a).
 The plaintiff submits that the circumstances of the case
(factor (b)) give rise to unfairness because her accident occurred
and her action was commenced at a time when the applicable
prejudgment interest rate was 5 per cent. The suggested unfairness relates to all actions commenced prior to January 1, 2015.
The plaintiff has not identified anything other than the timing of
the amendment under factor (b).
 In absolute terms, the difference between prejudgment
interest calculated at 1.3 per cent and that calculated on the
basis of either of the blended rates proposed by the plaintiff is
approximately $10,000. When considered in the context of a
total jury award of $652,500 (($125,000 + $600,000) x 0.9), the
difference in prejudgment interest represents 1.5 per cent of the
award. I find that the dollar amount of $10,000, in either absolute terms or as a percentage of the jury award, does not constitute a windfall to the defendant.
 In Cobb, the trial judge considered the passage of time
from the date of the collision to the date of trial (seven years, as
in the action before me). I place greater emphasis on the passage
of time between the date the action was commenced and the
date of the decision at trial (the jury’s verdict in the action before