me). I do so because only once the action is commenced does
anyone other than the plaintiff play a role in how quickly or
slowly the matter progresses.
 In this case, 4.5 years passed from the date the action was
commenced to the date of the jury’s verdict. Rightly or wrongly,
that is not an unusual amount of time between those two events
in personal injury actions.
 In this or any other action, the circumstances of the case
include changes in the default rate over time. There has not
been a significant change to the default rate since 2012. For all
of 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 and for the first quarter of 2015,
the default rate was 1 per cent. In 2016 and 2017, the default
rate was 0.5 per cent. If anything, those changes favour the
defendant’s position, not the plaintiff’s.
 In summary, I find nothing about “the circumstances of
the case” to support the exercise of my discretion pursuant to
s. 130(2) of the CJA.
 Turning to factor (c), there was no advance payment
made. Although the plaintiff was, as of the date of trial, in
receipt of long-term disability (“LTD”) benefits, her entitlement
to them was initially questioned. The plaintiff had to resort to
litigation against the LTD insurer to establish her entitlement to
the benefits. The lack of an advance payment is a factor to consider in this case.
 Neither party made any submissions with respect to factor (d): medical disclosure by the plaintiff.
 The plaintiff relies on factor (e): “the amount claimed and
the amount recovered in the proceeding”. The plaintiff claimed
non-pecuniary damages of $150,000. She was awarded $125,000
(83.3 per cent of the amount claimed). After contributory negligence is addressed, the plaintiff’s net recovery is $112,500
(75 per cent of the amount claimed). The plaintiff did not overreach with respect to her claim for non-pecuniary damages.
 The plaintiff submits that the defendant, having disputed
the plaintiff’s entitlement to non-pecuniary damages, should not
be entitled to benefit from the amendment by receiving a saving
on prejudgment interest. The defences in this action included
causation. I find there was nothing out of the ordinary in the
defendant advancing a causation defence. While that defence did
not ultimately succeed, it was not advanced as part of an “
everything but the kitchen sink” approach. In the circumstances of
this case, the defendant’s reliance on a causation defence does
not support the exercise of my discretion pursuant to s. 130(2).
 In summary, the factors that potentially support the exercise of my discretion pursuant to s. 130(2) of the CJA are factors