greater force. As Doherty J.A. put it in Brown v. Durham
Regional Police Force (1998), 43 O.R. (3d) 223,  O.J. No.
5274 (C.A.), at para. 79, “The balance struck between common
law police powers and individual liberties puts a premium on
individual freedom and makes crime prevention and peacekeep-
ing more difficult for the police.”
 The appellants submit that the trial judge ignored the
social and political considerations at issue in Caledonia. They
assert that the police had the duty not only to preserve the
peace for the public good, but for “the greater public interest in
reconciliation and negotiation with Indigenous communities
 I have already noted that the trial judge was well aware
of the history and ongoing conflict at Caledonia. However, the
public interest in reconciliation and negotiation with Indigenous
communities is not a relevant consideration in determining the
lawfulness of Mr. Fleming’s arrest for breaching the peace.
The exercise of his rights is not contingent on acknowledging or
endorsing reconciliation and negotiation or any other government policy. Mr. Fleming was entitled to attend and participate
in the flag rally regardless of its effect on the government’s
political goals at Caledonia or anywhere else, and, in particular,
regardless of whether the flag rally was considered provocative
by the government or the protesters.
 Political expression will often be provocative, and so considered problematic, but there is no doubt that its protection is a
core purpose of freedom of expression. I emphasize this point in
order to reinforce the importance of protecting the rights of those
who would take part in political protest. Although the police
may, in exceptional circumstances, arrest someone to avoid a
breach of the peace even if that person has broken no law, police
efforts should be directed towards those who would threaten violence — not those exercising their constitutionally protected
rights to protest peacefully.
 This approach is well established in American First
Amendment doctrine, which requires the police to take all reasonable steps before resorting to controlling the speaker. What
reasonableness requires is not always clear, but, as Frederick
Schauer notes, it is clear that “law enforcement may not initially
or prematurely arrest the speaker”: see Frederick Schauer, “The
Hostile Audience Revisited” (Paper commissioned by the Knight
First Amendment Institute at Columbia University, “Emerging
Threats” Series (December 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3093114, at p. 17.