minimums at issue resulted in sentences that were grossly disproportionate. Importantly, the hypotheticals considered did not
involve employees who believed the production was lawful. Consequently, the mistake of fact/law issue was irrelevant.
 In Serov, the court stated, at para. 39, “[b]oth provisions
cast a wide net, applying equally to a principal, a caretaker or
gardener, or to someone whose role may be, for example assisting, on a single day with watering, moving or cutting plants, or
repairing an electrical panel”. While the impugned provisions
were tailored to reflect the number of plants, they failed to
reflect the “role of the offender in committing the offence”
(at para. 33). The court concluded that applying the mandatory
minimums “regardless of the role of the offender in the marihuana grow operation, is grossly disproportionate in reasonably
foreseeable cases of less blameworthy offenders and therefore
offends s. 12 of the Charter” (at para. 39).
 Similarly, in McGee, the court agreed with the judge
below that a two-year sentence would be grossly disproportionate for a hypothetical offender “who was a party to the offence as
a result of minimal involvement in the grow operation by only
supplying soil to a grow operation, or delivering seedlings or a
bottle of nutrients to a grow site, or helping out at the harvest”
(at para. 20). The court rejected the Crown’s argument that such
assistance would not amount to aiding in the commission of the
offence of producing over 500 marijuana plants.
 The court also noted in McGee that Mr. McGee’s wife
faced the very scenario of being potentially subject to a significant mandatory minimum sentence as an offender who played a
limited role in a large-scale illicit grow operation.
 I agree that the hypotheticals arising from Johnson,
Serov and McGee point to reasonably foreseeable situations in
which a mistaken licensee or minimally involved helper could be
subject to a mandatory two-year sentence under s. 7(2)(b)( v),
which would be grossly disproportionate.
 Finally, turning to the Crown’s third issue, I would not
give effect to the Crown’s argument regarding the absence of
reasonable hypotheticals under the most recent version of the
regulations, the ACMPR. The reasonable hypotheticals I have
outlined, dealing with the mistaken licensee and minimally
involved helpers in illegal grow operations, could occur under
either the MMAR or the ACMPR.
 Like the Pham sentencing judge, I therefore also find it
unnecessary to deal with the “most compassionate, sympathetic,
or altruistic” hypotheticals advanced on behalf of Ms. Pham.