see also R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd., 2001 SCC 70,  3 S.C.R.
209, at para. 275. The test must not be applied in a manner that amounts to
identifying the Canadian province that has adopted the “preferable”
approach to a social issue and requiring that all other provinces follow suit.
 Lastly, the applicants’ position on this issue is ultimately
that, in the absence of documented studies demonstrating that the
existing circumstances, which rely essentially on a self-referral
model in the case of objecting physicians, result in restrictions on
access to health care, the court should find that the existing
arrangements represent an alternative, less drastic means of
achieving the objective of the Policies. I do not accept this argument for the reasons addressed above in this section and in
addressing the first criterion under the test in Oakes.
 Based on the foregoing, I conclude that the Policies fall
within the range of reasonable alternatives for addressing physicians’ conscientious and religious objections to particular medical
procedures and pharmaceuticals given the objective of the effective referral requirements of the Policies. As such, I find that the
effective referral requirements of the Policies satisfy the minimal
impairment test under Oakes.
 The final requirement of the proportionality test is that
“there must be a proportionality between the effects of the
measures which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or
freedom and the objective which has been identified as of ‘
sufficient importance’”: see Oakes, at para. 70. The applicants argue
that, in the present case, the effects fall disproportionately on
 McLachlin C.J.C. articulated the test for proportionality,
at para. 73 of Hutterian Brethren, as follows:
. . . are the overall effects of the law on the claimants disproportionate to the
government’s objective? When one balances the harm done to the claimants’
religious freedom against the benefits associated with the universal photo
requirement for driver’s licences, is the limit on the right proportionate in
effect to the public benefit conferred by the limit?
Accordingly, the court is required to identify and then weigh the
salutary effects and the deleterious effects of the effective referral
requirements of the Policies.
 I note that the standard of proof in regard to salutary
benefits was also addressed by McLachlin C.J.C. in Hutterian
Brethren, at para. 85, in the following terms:
As discussed earlier, a government enacting social legislation is not required
to show that the law will in fact produce the forecast benefits. Legislatures
can only be asked to impose measures that reason and the evidence suggest