commit an offence, which is not: see, e.g., Ralph, at para. 32;
Imoro, at paras. 13-17 (C.A.); R. v. Olazo,  B.C.J. No. 234,
2012 BCCA 59, 316 B.C.A.C. 176, at paras. 19-24. While the line
between an investigative step and an opportunity is sometimes
difficult to draw, the jurisprudence suggests that it is crossed in
the dial-a-dope context when the police make a specific offer to
purchase drugs as opposed to engage in a more general conversation aimed at confirming a tip: see Ralph, at para. 32; R. v.
Swan,  B.C.J. No. 623, 2009 BCCA 142, 269 B.C.A.C. 38,
at para. 29; see, also, Imoro, at para. 16 (C.A.). Indeed, if making
a specific offer to purchase drugs is not an opportunity, it is
difficult to imagine what the police could say to a suspected drug
trafficker that amounts to an opportunity but still falls short
 At the same time, however, in distinguishing between
investigative steps and opportunities, courts must not lose sight
of the underlying purpose of the entrapment doctrine, which is to
prevent the state from investigating possible illegal activity in
a way that offends our sense of decency and fair play: see R. v.
Pearson,  3 S.C.R. 620,  S.C.J. No. 86, at para. 11;
R. v. Clothier,  O.J. No. 102, 2011 ONCA 27, 273 O.A.C.
162, at para. 47. While courts must be careful not to condone
unfair police practices, an overly technical approach to the
entrapment doctrine risks detaching the doctrine from its purpose and unduly restricting police conduct.
 Bearing these principles in mind, I return to Mack. As
noted above, Mack sets out two categories of entrapment. These
appeals concern the first category, under which entrapment arises
if the police provide a person an opportunity to commit an offence
without acting either ( i) on a reasonable suspicion that the
person is already engaged in criminal activity, or ( ii) pursuant to
a bona fide inquiry. As Lamer J. explained, “[t]he absence of
a reasonable suspicion or a bona fide inquiry is significant in
assessing the police conduct because of the risk that the police
will attract people who would not otherwise have any involvement in a crime and because it is not a proper use of the police
power to simply go out and test the virtue of people on a random
basis”: Mack, at p. 965 S.C.R.
( ii) Reasonable suspicion
 Mack did not define the threshold of evidence required to
meet the “reasonable suspicion” standard. Although arising in
the context of searches, the Supreme Court’s comments in R. v.
Chehil,  3 S.C.R. 220,  S.C.J. No. 49, 2013 SCC 49,
about the reasonable suspicion standard are instructive. In that