— outlined the principles from R. v. Lifchus,  3 S.C.R.
320,  S.C.J. No. 77 and R. v. W. (D.),  1 S.C.R.
742,  S.C.J. No. 26 on the burden of proof and the
assessment of evidence (paras. 36-39);
— found Mr. Ahmad’s evidence was “not believable”. Specifi-
cally, the trial judge noted that Mr. Ahmad did not feel com-
pelled to give Mikey’s name to the police, the person he said
was guilty of the offences. He also said that he initially lied to
the police, saying he did not know him. His testimony was
self-serving, remembering that Mikey had a backpack, but
not what he was wearing, nor other details about him. More-
over, the defence theory left open how the police got the
backpack (paras. 40-48); and
— found that the officers’ evidence was credible. Mr. Ahmad’s
counsel pointed to minor inconsistencies in their testimony,
but the discrepancies identified would be reasonably
expected given the nature of human perception. In the trial
judge’s view, the officers were forthright and presented their
evidence in a cogent manner, even under vigorous cross-
examination (paras. 49-51, 57).
 On appeal, Mr. Ahmad alleges that the trial judge rejected
his evidence primarily because he exercised his right to silence by
withholding from the police the guilty party’s name ( i.e., Mikey).
She also inferred that his silence was indicative of a guilty mind.
Moreover, Mr. Ahmad submits that the trial judge made inconsistent findings of fact by using his evidence regarding utterances
he made to the police before and after his arrest to undermine
his credibility, despite rejecting his evidence in its entirety and
despite there being no corroborating evidence on those utterances
from the Crown witnesses.
 I would not give effect to this ground of appeal.
 I accept the Crown’s submission that the trial judge’s reasons, read fairly, do not indicate that she used Mr. Ahmad’s
silence to reject his credibility or infer guilt. Rather, she thoroughly reviewed various aspects of his evidence and found that
his explanation of events lacked common sense. In contrast, she
accepted the officers’ evidence, which contradicted Mr. Ahmad’s
evidence and was not challenged in any meaningful way.
 The appellant partially relies on this court’s decision in
R. v. Palmer,  O.J. No. 4753, 2008 ONCA 797, 81 W.C.B.
(2d) 140 in support of this ground. In Palmer, this court reasoned
that it was [at para. 9] “open to the trial judge to reject the appellant’s explanation given at trial [about why she did not advance