In R. v. Downes (2006), 79 O.R. (3d) 321,  O.J. No. 555
(C.A.), at para. 33, Rosenberg J.A. said the following in relation to
the consideration of stringent bail conditions at sentencing:
Accordingly, I conclude that time spent under stringent bail conditions,
especially under house arrest, must be taken into account as a relevant
mitigating circumstance. However, like any potential mitigating circum-
stance, there will be variations in its potential impact on the sentence
and the circumstances may dictate that little or no credit should be
given for pre-sentence house arrest . . . [I]t is incumbent on the sentenc-
ing judge to explain why he or she has decided not to take pre-sentence
house arrest into account. The failure to do so will constitute an error
 The trial judge did not mention Mr. Ahmad’s pre-sentence
house arrest, let alone explain why she did not take it into
account. This was an error.
 It was also an error for the trial judge to cite as an aggravating factor the fact that Mr. Ahmad “did not provide information about his family and his background to the author of the
PSR, information that would have been useful to the court”
(para. 22). As the appellant argued, there was no obligation on
Mr. Ahmad to do so. While a sentencing judge may take into
account information provided in the pre-sentence report when
evaluating aggravating and mitigating factors, and an offender
may very well not be helping himself by failing to provide
information, that failure on its own is not an aggravating factor.
 I am not convinced that the trial judge “improperly dou-ble-counted” Mr. Ahmad’s youth record simply because she additionally noted that that record appears not to have deterred him
from criminal activity. Further, I do not accept that the trial judge
failed to place enough emphasis on rehabilitation, including the
facts of Mr. Ahmad’s bail compliance and that he obtained a university degree. She explicitly discussed both of these facts in relation to rehabilitation.
 Despite the erroneous considerations outlined above,
I agree with the Crown that the sentence was at the lower end of
the established range. This is particularly so given that the evidence established that Mr. Ahmad was a busy commercial trafficker, deeply involved in the drug business. At the time of his
arrest, he had on his person a large amount of cocaine and cash,
and two cellphones. Mr. Ahmad also had a previous conviction for
the unauthorized possession of a firearm. In my view, the sentence was entirely fit in the circumstances.
 For the foregoing reasons, I would