( i) grant the Crown’s appeal in Mr. Williams’ case and set aside
the stay of the drug transaction charges. Given that Mr. Williams has otherwise acknowledged his guilt, I would enter
convictions on those charges and remit the case to the trial
court for sentencing on those charges;
( ii) dismiss Mr. Williams’ cross-appeal;
( iii) dismiss Mr. Ahmad’s conviction appeal; and
( iv) grant Mr. Ahmad leave to appeal his sentence, but dismiss
his sentence appeal.
HIMEL J. (ad hoc) (concurring): —
 I have read the reasons of the majority and agree that the
Crown’s appeal in Landon Williams’ case should be allowed,
Mr. Williams’ cross-appeal should be dismissed and Javid Ahmad’s
appeal should be dismissed on the basis that the doctrine of
entrapment does not apply to either of them. However, I arrive at
this result for different reasons than those of my colleagues. In
my view, the police in both cases acted on a reasonable suspicion
that Mr. Williams and Mr. Ahmad were already engaged in criminal activity when they presented them with an opportunity to
commit an offence. Accordingly, there is no need to consider
whether the police were acting pursuant to a bona fide inquiry.
 I adopt the majority’s statement of the facts.
(a) Overview of the “reasonable suspicion” requirement
 In the leading decision on entrapment, R. v. Mack, 
2 S.C.R. 903,  S.C.J. No. 91, Lamer J. wrote the following,
at pp. 964-65 S.C.R.:
[T]here is entrapment when, (a) the authorities provide a person with an op-
portunity to commit an offence without acting on a reasonable suspicion that
this person is already engaged in criminal activity or pursuant to a bona fide
inquiry; (b) although having such a reasonable suspicion or acting in the
course of a bona fide inquiry, they go beyond providing an opportunity and
induce the commission of an offence.
See, also, R. v. Barnes,  1 S.C.R. 449,  S.C.J. No. 17,
at p. 460 S.C.R.