The rationale for this test is twofold. First, if there is no
reasonable suspicion or bona fide inquiry, there is a risk that
police will attract people who otherwise would not be involved in
criminal activity to commit an offence; and, second, it is not a
proper use of the police’s power to randomly test the virtue of
people: Barnes, at p. 460 S.C.R.; and Mack, at p. 965 S.C.R.
 Entrapment is to be recognized in only the “clearest of
cases”: Mack, at p. 976 S.C.R. The doctrine of entrapment will not
apply if the police acted on a reasonable suspicion that the
accused was already engaged in criminal activity when they presented the accused with an opportunity to commit an offence:
Barnes, at p. 460 S.C.R.; and Mack, at p. 964 S.C.R. However, the
presence of a reasonable suspicion or a bona fide inquiry will not
justify police techniques that go beyond providing an opportunity:
Barnes, at p. 460 S.C.R.; and Mack, at p. 965 S.C.R. Once an
accused has demonstrated that the police used tactics that went
beyond acceptable limits, “judicial condonation of the prosecution
would by definition offend the community”: Mack, at p. 976
 Reasonable suspicion requires “something more than a
mere suspicion and something less than a belief based upon reasonable and probable grounds”: R. v. Chehil,  3 S.C.R.
220,  S.C.J. No. 49, 2013 SCC 49, at para. 26; and R. v.
Kang-Brown,  1 S.C.R. 456,  S.C.J. No. 18, 2008
SCC 18, at para. 75. It “addresses the possibility of uncovering
criminality, and not a probability of doing so”: Chehil, at para.
32 [emphasis in original]; Kang-Brown, at para. 75; and R. v.
Ayangma,  P.E.I.J. No. 19, 2016 PECA 6, 375 Nfld. &
P.E.I.R. 73, at para. 37, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 
S.C.C.A. No. 271. Reasonable suspicion involves “a reasonable
belief that an individual might be connected to a particular
offence, as opposed to a reasonable belief that an individual
is connected to the offence”: R. v. MacKenzie,  3 S.C.R.
250,  S.C.J. No. 50, 2013 SCC 50, at para. 74 [emphasis in
original]. Even though a “hunch” or “feeling” will not give rise
to a reasonable suspicion, the standard is “necessarily . . . low”
and not “unduly onerous”: Barnes, at p. 460 S.C.R.; R. v. Cahill,
 B.C.J. No. 793, 12 B.C.A.C. 247 (C.A.), at para. 35; and
Mack, at p. 958 S.C.R.
 Reasonable suspicion involves “a minimal level of belief
which does not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct or
‘other reasonable possibilities’”: R. v. Williams,  O.J. No.
1324, 2010 ONSC 1698 (S.C.J.), at para. 44, citing United States v.
Gould, 364 F. 3d 578 (5th Cir. 2004), at p. 593. It “can be established with information that is different in quantity or content