than that required to establish probable cause” and it can “arise
from information that is less reliable than that required to show
probable cause”: Kang-Brown, at para. 75, citing Alabama v.
White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990), at p. 330. Although reasonable suspicion must be based on “objectively discernible facts”, “[w]hat will
give rise to a reasonable suspicion . . . will vary from case to case”:
Chehil, at para. 3; and Cahill, at para. 34.
 The Supreme Court of Canada’s description of reasonable
suspicion in MacKenzie, at para. 72, is instructive:
Exculpatory, common, neutral, or equivocal information should not be
discarded when assessing a constellation of factors. However, the test for
reasonable suspicion will not be stymied when the factors which give rise to
it are supportive of an innocent explanation. We are looking here at possi-
bilities, not probabilities. Are the facts objectively indicative of the possibil-
ity of criminal behaviour in light of the totality of the circumstances? If so,
the objective component of the test will have been met. If not, the inquiry is
at an end.
(b) Application to the cases at bar
 It is my view that early on in their telephone conversations, the undercover officers acquired a reasonable suspicion
that Mr. Williams and Mr. Ahmad were already engaged in criminal activity.
 In Mr. Williams’ case, ( i) the police were acting on a tip
that they had received from a confidential source, which indicated
that a person by the name of “Jay” was using a certain phone
number and selling cocaine in a particular area of Toronto; and
( ii) the reliability of this tip was confirmed when the officer called
the phone number and the person who answered immediately
acknowledged that he was Jay.
 In Mr. Ahmad’s case, ( i) the police were again acting on
a tip, which revealed that a person by the name of “Romeo” was
selling powder cocaine and using the phone number [number
omitted]; ( ii) although the person who answered the call did not
confirm he was Romeo, he did not question the name, and instead
continued the dialogue; and ( iii) the person who answered the call
engaged in a conversation with an apparent stranger, using coded
language familiar to the drug trade. When the officer stated
“Matt said I can give you a call . . . said you can help me out?” the
person who answered did not react with surprise or indignation
or say “What do you mean?” or “What are you talking about?” or
“You’ve got the wrong number.” Rather, his response was consistent with what a drug dealer would say: “What do you need?”
This confirmed the reliability of the tip. See R. v. Ralph, 
O.J. No. 5306, 2011 ONSC 4125 (S.C.J.), at para. 34, affd 
O.J. No. 13, 2014 ONCA 3, 313 O.A.C. 384, leave to appeal to