S.C.C. refused  S.C.C.A. No. 262. He also responded as if he
knew who the “Matt” used by the undercover officer in his back-story was, which confirmed the reliability of the tip further.
 Moreover, Mr. Ahmad’s response “What do you need?” to
D.C. Limsiaco’s statement “said you can help me out?” is similar
to Mr. Olazo’s positive response to the officer’s question “can you
meet me” or “where are you” in R. v. Olazo,  B.C.J. No.
234, 2012 BCCA 59, 316 B.C.A.C. 176, at paras. 8 and 26. In that
case, the British Columbia Court of Appeal concluded that
Mr. Olazo’s response demonstrated a familiarity with drug terminology, helped to confirm the tip and, in doing so, established
a reasonable suspicion: Olazo, at paras. 26, 30.
 While my colleagues conclude that the police did not
have a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Williams and Mr. Ahmad
were already engaged in criminal activity, they do find that the
police had a reasonable suspicion that the phone lines were
being used for criminal activity. With respect, I do not agree
with this approach.
 First, to suggest that an undercover officer can reasonably suspect that a particular phone line is being used for a dial-a-dope scheme, but not reasonably suspect that the person who
answers that phone is engaged in such a scheme is to ignore
a fundamental reality: phones are increasingly personal. Although some people might pick up their friend or relative’s
phone when it rings, an undercover officer can still reasonably
suspect that the person who answers is the user or owner of
that phone. After all, in assessing reasonable suspicion “[w]e
are looking . . . at possibilities, not probabilities”: MacKenzie,
at para. 72. Accordingly, in the dial-a-dope context, there is little
real difference between information that the police obtain about
the phone line and information that they obtain about the person who answers it. Quite often, information about the one is
information about the other.
 Second, my colleagues consider certain facts in concluding that the police reasonably suspected that the phone lines were
being used for criminal activity, but it is unclear why these same
facts could not have also supported a finding that there was
a reasonable suspicion with respect to Mr. Williams and Mr. Ahmad’s
involvement in criminal activity.
 For example, the majority relies on the fact that no
information was conveyed about the reliability of the source and
the information the source provided in finding that there was no
reasonable suspicion that Mr. Williams was involved in a dial-a-dope scheme. However, in concluding that there was a reasonable
suspicion that the phone line was being used for such a purpose,