the reasonable suspicion crystallized before any offer to commit
a crime occurred.
 Finally, a necessarily principled approach to the doctrine
of entrapment leads to the same conclusion that entrapment is
not made out in this case.
 The reasonable suspicion requirement under the entrapment doctrine seeks to prevent police conduct that will attract
innocent and otherwise law-abiding individuals to commit a crime
that they would not have otherwise committed: Mack, at pp. 957,
965 S.C.R.; and Le, at para. 94. It was designed to target police
“conduct that the citizenry cannot tolerate” and will only be recognized in the “clearest of cases”: Mack, at pp. 917, 976 S.C.R.
Although the Supreme Court in Mack acknowledged that the
power of the police to investigate criminal activity is not unlimited, it also sought to give the police considerable latitude so that
they can effectively investigate crime: Mack, at pp. 917, 941
S.C.R.; and Imoro, at paras. 8-9.
 In determining whether the defence of entrapment has
been made out it is essential that the court does not lose sight of
these underlying reasons for recognizing the doctrine in the
first place: Mack, at p. 965 S.C.R. However, some of the jurisprudence has done exactly that. A number of cases have narrowly focused on the minute language choices of the investigating
officer to find entrapment despite the fact that the police conduct does not risk causing an innocent person to sell drugs. The
court must never lose sight of the core question: is the police’s
conduct really offensive? As the Supreme Court identified in
Mack, at p. 942 S.C.R., “[ i]n the entrapment context, the court’s
sense of justice is offended by the spectacle of an accused’s being
convicted of an offence which is the work of the state”. Staying
cases in which there is no actual offensive police conduct is
harmful to the integrity of the administration of justice. It is
crucial “that the police be allowed to carry out their duties
without undue scepticism or the requirement that their every
move be placed under a scanning electron microscope”:
MacKenzie, at para. 65.
 The British Columbia Court of Appeal’s comments in Le,
at para. 95, are also apt here:
Objectively speaking, innocent and otherwise law-abiding individuals would
not be “manipulated” or tempted to enter the dangerous and illicit drug trade
if asked by a stranger over the phone to sell him drugs. It defies common
sense to suggest that asking whether an individual is willing to sell specific
types, quantities, or values of illicit drugs runs the “serious unnecessary risk”
that an otherwise innocent person would then go out, procure the drugs,
meet with and sell them to a stranger.