service of the underlying claim would provide “ample time” to
exercise due diligence to determine against whom to claim.
 Perell J.’s reasons in Miaskowski have been followed in
a number of subsequent decisions of this court.4 However it
should also be noted that a different interpretation of the effect of
s. 18 was taken by Leach J. of this court in Demide v. Canada
(Attorney General).5 In Demide, Leach J. held that s. 18 of the Act
merely determines the relevant presumed starting point for the
basic two year limitation period for purposes of s. 5(2), a presumption that was still capable of being rebutted by proof to the
contrary. Although s. 18 does not include language referring to
“proof to the contrary”, Leach J. observed that the inclusion of
such wording in s. 18 was unnecessary given that this wording
was already found in s. 5(2). He also noted that interpreting s. 18
as establishing an absolute two-year limitation period for claims
for contribution and indemnity would make the ultimate limitation period in s. 15 redundant.
 Leach J. accepted that an absolute two-year limitation
period for contribution and indemnity claims would provide certainty and efficiency, which was one of the policies underlying the
2002 reforms to the Act. But, as he observed, the same could be
said in relation to making any limitation period absolute. In
Leach J.’s view, the overall goal of the legislation was to strike
a balance between a defendant’s need for certainty with the
plaintiff’s right to sue. The legislature generally tried to strike
that balance by imposing a presumptive two-year limitation
period, capable of extension by demonstrable lack of discovery,
proof of which was the obligation of the claimant. While it might
be a rare case that a defendant, exercising due diligence within
two years of being served with the claim, would not know against
whom to bring a claim for contribution and indemnity, rarity is
not impossibility. In fact, the rarity of such a possibility underscored for Leach J. the somewhat modest concession to fairness of
making the limitation period for contribution and indemnity
claims subject to discoverability.
 With due respect to the contrary view, I prefer the interpretation adopted by Leach J.
 First, this interpretation is consistent with the plain meaning of the relevant provisions. As discussed earlier, s. 18 is merely
4 See, for example, Hughes v. Dyck (2016), 129 O.R. (3d) 495,  O.J.
No. 820, 2016 ONSC 901 (S.C.J.); Mega International Commercial Bank
(Canada) v. Yung,  O.J. No. 2511, 2017 ONSC 1005 (S.C.J.).
5  O.J. No. 2611, 2015 ONSC 3000 (S.C.J.) (“Demide”).