an interpretive provision. It specifies the date upon which the
act or omission on which a claim for contribution and indemnity
is deemed to have taken place. But s. 18 is not a substantive provision purporting to limit the commencement of legal proceedings
and, as such, it cannot operate as a “stand-alone” limitation period.
 It is true that s. 18 utilizes the term “deemed” rather, than
language referring to a rebuttable presumption or the possibility of
“proof to the contrary”. But it is important to be clear about what
is being “deemed” through this provision. As discussed earlier, s. 18
does not deem a claim to have been “discovered” on the date of
service of the underlying statement of claim; rather, it deems the
“day of the act or omission upon which the claim is based” to be
the date of service of the underlying statement of claim. While the
“day of the act or omission upon which the claim is based” is certainly a key date in the determination of the date upon which
a claim is “discovered”, that determination can only be made
through the application and operation of s. 5(1)(a), (b) and (2) of
the Act, which would necessarily include consideration of the qualifying language “unless the contrary is proved” as found in s. 5(2).
 Presumably, the legislature did not include language referring to “proof to the contrary” in s. 18 because it did not want to
leave any room for argument or doubt on the question of the date
upon which the presumption in s. 5(2) have effect in cases of
claims for contribution and indemnity. But the absence of any
reference to a “rebuttable presumption” in s. 18 does not in any
way suggest that the presumption in s. 5(2) should be ignored or
read out of the Act.
 As Leach J. pointed out in Demide, if s. 18 is interpreted as
creating an absolute two-year limitation period for claims for contribution and indemnity, s. 15 of the Act is thereby rendered redundant. Yet this could not have been the intention underlying s. 18
since it expressly referred to s. 15. Unlike s. 5(2), s. 15 does not
make reference to a rebuttable presumption or provide the possibility of proof to the contrary. Therefore, the effect of s. 18 in relation
to s. 15 is to provide an absolute 15-year limitation period for claims
for contribution and indemnity, commencing on the date of the service of the statement of claim against the first alleged wrongdoer.
 It is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation
that the legislature does not intend to produce consequences
which would render a statute illogical or incoherent, or which
render some aspects of it pointless or futile.6 In my view, it would
6 Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re) (1998), 36 O.R. (3d) 418,  1 S.C.R. 27,
 S.C.J. No. 2 (“Rizzo”), at para. 27; P.A. Côte, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada, 2nd ed. (Cowansville, Que.: Yvon Blais, 1991), at pp. 378-80.