that is, it is not plain and obvious that the claim of negligence and
misfeasance in public office brought by police officers against
the Attorney General would fail (see Clark v. Attorney General
for Ontario,  O.J. No. 3236, 2017 ONSC 3683 (S.C.J.)).
However, that case essentially follows the analysis of the motion
judge in the present case (see paras. 39 and 77).
 Instead of following the line of appellate cases, the motion
judge drew a distinction between those past cases and the present
case on the basis of the identity of the claimant. Earlier in her
reasons, she found that the plaintiff’s claim against the Crown
attorneys based on negligent investigation was barred by prosecutorial immunity. I agree with that conclusion. However, I see no
justification for the conclusion that the scope of prosecutorial
immunity should be different when the police, rather than
a member of the public, claim indemnity for negligent advice during the investigation process.
 It is clear from the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions
regarding the scope of prosecutorial immunity that policy considerations play an important role in considering whether there
should be an exception to absolute immunity. Policy considerations were discussed in both Nelles and Miazga. Moldaver J. also
discussed two of these policy concerns in Henry, where he rejected
an argument that the policy concerns in the earlier trilogy of
cases (Nelles, Proulx and Miazga) were confined to “the exercise
of core prosecutorial discretion”. Rather, he stated that the policy
concerns have a “broader reach and are implicated whenever
there is a risk of undue interference with the ability of prosecutors to freely carry out their duties in furtherance of the administration of justice” (at para. 76).
 The prime concern is the impact of a qualified immunity
on the administration of criminal justice. In particular, the
Supreme Court has discussed the concern that Crown attorneys
will be diverted from their important public duties in the administration of criminal justice if the threshold for civil liability is set
too low. A further concern is the “chilling effect” on Crown counsels’ decision making if the threshold is too low. As Moldaver J.
stated in Henry, “[f]ear of civil liability may lead to defensive lawyering by prosecutors” (at para. 73).
 Both of those policy concerns arise in the present case.
In particular, the exposure of Crown attorneys to negligence
claims, based on their provision of legal advice in the course of
a criminal investigation, risks diverting them from their public
duty in the administration of justice. Exposure to civil liability
could also lead prosecutors to act defensively in carrying out their
duties when they give legal advice.