be a further exception to immunity for civil claims. The jurisprudence makes it clear that the exceptions to prosecutorial
immunity arise when the Crown attorney is acting outside of his
or her duty as a “minister of justice”. There is no allegation in
the present case that the appellants acted in bad faith or intentionally interfered with a Charter disclosure obligation. In these
circumstances, where simple negligence is alleged, it is plain and
obvious that prosecutorial immunity applies, whether the claimant is a member of the public or the police.
 Given my conclusion that it is plain and obvious that the
cross-claim must fail because of the scope of prosecutorial
immunity, it is not necessary to discuss the second issue, namely,
whether the allegation that Crown attorneys have a duty of
care in tort to the police has no reasonable prospect of success.
I express no opinion on the soundness of the motion judge’s conclusion with respect to this issue.
 Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, and the cross-claim of
the respondents is dismissed. Costs of the appeal and leave to
appeal are fixed at $15,000, an amount agreed upon by the parties, payable jointly by the respondents and the York defendants
to the appellants.
 The appellants also seek costs of the motion below, given
their total success on the motion. The motion judge had awarded
no costs because success was divided.
 I would award costs of the motion to the appellant in the
amount of $5,000, payable jointly by the Durham defendants and
by the York defendants.