As I will explain, this court in 771225 Ontario Inc. v.
Bramco Holdings Co. (1995), 21 O.R. (3d) 739,  O.J. No. 157
(C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused  S.C.C.A. No. 147
(“Bramco”), recognized that any equitable jurisdiction that
a court may have to relieve against a mistake cannot be invoked
in order to retroactively alter a transaction to achieve a tax planning objective.
 In my view, Bramco remains an impediment to the exercise of the equitable jurisdiction of the court to correct the mistake that was made in this case. Although this court in Juliar
adopted an expansive view of rectification as a basis to avoid the
principle articulated in Bramco, in Fairmont Hotels, the Supreme
Court expressly shut down this approach when it overruled
Juliar. Rectification is now limited to cases where the written
instrument fails to record correctly the parties’ agreement.
 In addition, Fairmont Hotels and Jean Coutu also affirm
the underlying policy rationale of Bramco; it is not possible to
alter corporate transactions on a nunc pro tunc basis to achieve
particular tax objectives. In other words, the Supreme Court has
signaled that retroactive tax planning by order of the Superior
Court exercising its equitable jurisdiction is impermissible.
 TCR Holding Corp. v. Ontario,  O.J. No. 1238, 2010
ONCA 233, 261 O.A.C. 256, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused
 S.C.C.A. No. 206 (“TCR Holding”), does not alter this
result. While this court may have recognized that other equitable
remedies remain generally available even when rectification is
not, it did not authorize such equitable remedies for the purpose
of impermissible retroactive tax planning. I turn now to the
development of these key principles in the case law.
(a) Bramco precludes resort to equitable jurisdiction to
retroactively achieve a tax objective
 In Bramco, the appellant, Ms. Ho, sought to correct a mistake in a property transfer. After entering into an agreement to
purchase land in the name of one of her numbered companies,
she effected the transfer to a second company, which was a nonresident. The result was a land transfer tax of $1.7 million, when
a transfer of the property to the first company would have
attracted land transfer tax of less than $85,000.
 This court upheld the decision of the application judge
refusing rectification. The structure for the transaction was
selected with income tax consequences in mind, and not with
a view to minimizing land transfer tax. Ms. Ho’s intention was
always to take title in the name of the second company. The mistake was in failing to take into consideration the land transfer tax